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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
INNOVATIVE TWO-STAGE FUZZY CLASSIFICATION FOR UNKNOWN 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
by 
Xueyan Sharon Jing 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida  
Professor Hai Deng, Major Professor 
Intrusion detection is the essential part of network security in combating against illegal 
network access or malicious cyberattacks. Due to the constantly evolving nature of cyber 
attacks, it has been a technical challenge for an intrusion detection system (IDS) to 
effectively recognize unknown attacks or known attacks with inadequate training data. 
Therefore in this dissertation work, an innovative two-stage classifier is developed for 
accurately and efficiently detecting both unknown attacks and known attacks with 
insufficient or inaccurate training information.  
The novel two-stage fuzzy classification scheme is based on advanced machine learning 
techniques specifically for handling the ambiguity of traffic connections and network 
data. In the first stage of the classification, a fuzzy C-means (FCM) algorithm is 
employed to softly compute and optimize clustering centers of the training datasets with 
some degree of fuzziness counting for feature inaccuracy and ambiguity in the training 
data. Subsequently, a distance-weighted k-NN (k-nearest neighbors) classifier, combined 
with the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST), is introduced to assess the belief functions and 
pignistic probabilities of the incoming data associated with each of known classes to 
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further address the data uncertainty issue in the cyberattack data. In the second stage of 
the proposed classification algorithm, a subsequent classification scheme is implemented 
based on the obtained pignistic probabilities and their entropy functions to determine if 
the input data are normal, one of the known attacks or an unknown attack. Secondly, to 
strengthen the robustness to attacks, we form the three-layer hierarchy ensemble classifier 
based on the FCM weighted k-NN DST classifier to have more precise inferences than 
those made by a single classifier. The proposed intrusion detection algorithm is evaluated 
through the application of the KDD’99 datasets and their variants containing known and 
unknown attacks. The experimental results show that the new two-stage fuzzy KNN-DST 
classifier outperforms other well-known classifiers in intrusion detection and is especially 
effective in detecting unknown attacks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
The security-related issues of computers and networks have become exceptionally 
significant. The rapidly growing use of computer systems and the internet has 
emphasized the need to guaranteeing secure accessibility of billions of computer users to 
internet information. How to insure legitimate access to privileged information has been a 
major area of concern for information processing technology in computer networks. 
Defense mechanisms against malicious attacks must be able to protect the network before 
the system becomes compromised [1].  
The protection policies being investigated since the last three decades, to date, have also 
addressed the problem of information security. Security denotes the property of 
protection against compromised: unauthorized dissemination of information. The security 
policy defines access domains of subjects based on considerations derived from the 
manufacturers of computer systems.  Detection mechanisms are passive policy 
enforcement devices that are different with prevention mechanisms.  Prevention 
mechanisms attempt to intercept potential violations, detection mechanisms monitor 
system activities, often maintaining records to aid in damage assessment, limitation, and 
recovery.  However, a detection mechanism may include only very simple journaling 
programs that have no logic whatsoever regarding the significance of the events they 
record. Conceivably, certain violations could only be recognized after the fact through 
complex logical and statistical analyses. 
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One method of a computer security mechanism is intrusion detection.  Its purpose is to 
monitor and identify malicious behavior, unauthorized access, or any other types of 
unfaithful forces that attempt to access information.    On the other hand, if any attacks 
occur, intrusion detection should have the potential to undermine any safeguards that 
might have been built into computer programs or application systems. An intrusion 
detection system [2] (IDS) was proposed to provide maximum protection to systems with 
sensitive information. Unlike a traditional security mechanism such as firewalls, time-of-
use stamps, audit trails, flow control, or authentication, IDS monitors these detection 
systems for both malicious and normal connections, which make IDS an imperative 
player in the computer network security process.  
Cyber-crimes have happened seriously and continuously in many computer networking, 
because the attackers keep on developing new forms of attacks where current IDS tools 
failed to detect or stop these new attacks, and also the patterns of normal traffic will be 
changed.  
1.1 General Approaches to intrusion detection 
About fifty years ago, IDS was first brought out as a security mechanism for monitoring 
and deciding the allowability of all access by information processors to information 
repositories. An IDS must satisfy the following properties: 
• It is wide-ranging: all computer network access from internal or external, both 
novel or known malicious intrusion are monitored and enforced 
• It is safeguarded: the function of IDS may not be maliciously or accidently 
modified by unauthorized forces 
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• Its well-timed: IDS may analysis and make a decision in a timely manner to 
respond for the abnormal behaviors. 
• It has provably proper performance: IDS must faithfully enforce the specified 
protection strategy with higher detection rate and lower error rate.  
Basically, there are mainly two types of IDS techniques: anomaly detection [5] and 
misuse detection [6] techniques.  
Misuse method builds up the attack signature and looks for known attacks. Misuse 
detection model compares the incoming traffic connections with previously stored known 
attack patterns. If there is deviation that exists then these connections are declared as 
attacks. The primary modes of building up abnormal profiles are auditing and 
surveillance. Auditing keeps the records of activities include users logging in and out, the 
granting and revoking of access rights, and access violations, both attempted and 
successful. Surveillance is the active monitoring of both normal and abnormal activities 
on the system in real-time and useful to commands in charge of security. The majority 
techniques in IDS are using this type of detection.  The disadvantage of misuse detection 
is that it can only detect known attacks and fail to detect unknown attacks. Another 
shortcoming of misuse detection is that it spends time on creating the profile of the new 
attack signature and updates it manually into the IDS model.  
While anomaly methods build up normal patterns and can detect abnormal access that 
deviates from the normal patterns in profiles.  Whenever a possible mismatch happens, it 
implies that unauthorized intruders attack and sneak into the computer system. These 
normal pattern profiles are built through any computer system behaviors, such as access 
command lines, data audit logs, network packets, and thread calls, etc. Data mining 
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techniques and machine learning methods are often used to help to identify the network 
connection as normal connection or malicious attacks. Anomaly techniques can indicate a 
potential threat both known and unknown whenever there is a significant deviation from 
anomaly model of reference. Anomaly techniques also have their disadvantages. It 
suffers from the high false alarms generated from the IDS models by misclassification 
normal behavior into attacks [7]. Both of these methods aims to provide the solution that 
can offer more accurate detection rate while keeping low false positive rate.   
Numerous researches have been realized in IDS. Some classical IDS methods like 
decision trees and variants of Bayes are adopted to detect attacks in computer network 
connections, and still have the problem of poor detection performance to classify 
malicious attacks (especially unknown attacks) from normal traffic connections. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
No matter using which IDS methods, many challenging issues have grown in designing 
IDS models. Both misuse detection and anomaly detection are suffering from these issues: 
1.2.1 Feature Selection 
A large amount of computer network data needs to be collected for analysis to identify 
the abnormal behaviors from normal behaviors.  These collected network data is 
described with many features such as protocol type, connection duration, destination 
port#, source port#, and other features.  Thus in turn, the large dimension of these 
features makes the IDS process more difficult and complex with higher error rates. Some 
features are irrelevant and redundant to the attack patterns and it could slow the 
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identification process. Therefore, Using feature selection or feature extraction is 
necessary to the performance of the detection techniques adopted.  
1.2.2 Supervised Learning and Unsupervised Learning 
In supervised learning the algorithm is trained with predefined opinions based on labeled 
data to help with predictive model testing. In some way, supervised learning is similar 
with learning with experts because the answer (labels in IDS) is offered. The 
unsupervised learning scenario would not use the labels at all to help IDS model 
understand the data, also similar with learning without experts because the answer is not 
offered. Supervised learning costs time, and require experts and measurements, while 
unsupervised learning function well with noisy data containing corrupt data that cannot 
be analysis or interpreted correctly. Semi-supervised learning is a method that employs 
both labeled (usually small amount) and unlabeled data (usually large amount) for 
training. Semi-supervised learning sometimes helps predictive model testing to reduce 
the cost and improve the performance. 
1.2.3 Ambiguity and Uncertainty Classification 
Many researches in IDS have been dedicated to solve the ambiguity of traffic data and 
need to be able to acknowledge and handle with ambiguity. That is, to some degree the 
connections are too ambiguous to be assigned to malicious classes or normal class. It is 
difficult to completely distinguish certain types of attacks, which often embedded in the 
packets and is hard to be separated from normal connections. The problem could be the 
patterns of these types of attacks is alike the patterns of normal connections or the 
boundary between normal connection and attack are blur.  We really hope to find out how 
6 
 
ambiguity issues related to network data effect the security of computer systems and to 
offer a better interpretation of ambiguity as a concept of fuzziness in IDS, which can help 
researchers to deal with the ambiguity problem.  
1.2.4 Unknown Attack Detection 
Cybercrimes have happened seriously and continuously in many computer-networking 
systems, because the attackers keep on developing new form of attacks. The malicious 
unknown attacks arise from the requirements for open use and sharing information 
system. Present day computer systems require largely open sharing systems. The major 
threat to these systems is that of external penetration. In the case of open use and sharing 
systems there is an implication of unprotected communications lines for subscribers not 
performing classified processing that increases the exposure to outside penetration. The 
external penetration threat could be countered by using combinations of different 
communication security techniques, but still missed in many cases. These techniques, 
some highly advanced, are the bulk of the present state-of-the-art in computer security.  
The technical issue of novel attack detection is concerned with the concept of unknown 
attack classification methods. By this we recognized that the nature of shared use 
computer systems present to a malicious users a unique opportunity for attempting to 
subvert through programming the mechanism upon which security depends.  In effect, the 
defense against new types of attacks should surround the system and its user environment 
with a solid barrier that must be breached before the system can be compromised.  
While we emphasize the threat both known and unknown from a malicious users, we are 
not unmindful of other security threats and risks. The problems of accidental spillage of 
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classified information, physical penetration of system sites, interference with or intercept 
of communications, mishandling of classified material and the like are serious.  To a 
large extent, these problems are common to any information system processing classified 
information including mobile network and wireless sensor works, and can be solved by 
well-understood techniques.  However, the hackers in the context of a resource shared 
system always presents new type of threats, control of which is necessary before the 
objective of full use of shred computer systems can be realized.  
1.2.5 Penetration of systems 
There is little question that contemporary commercially available systems do not provide 
an adequate defense against malicious threat. Although current IDS models have improve 
the detection rate and lower the error rate, most of these systems are known to have 
serious design and implementation flaws that can be exploited by individuals with 
programming access to the system. As an instance of this, we note that the current 
computer system has a number of major flaws that would permit hackers to subvert the 
nominal security controls that exist in the system. The IDS designs still face the 
challenges of implementation flaws in most contemporary systems permit intruders to 
seize unauthorized control of the system, and thus have access to any of the information 
on the system. While the techniques for defense the vulnerability on contemporary 
systems vary, they ultimately boil down to graining either directly or indirectly, an 
authorized access capability to classified data.  
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1.2.6 Operational Cost and Economic Consideration 
Each IDS method the consequences of the inadequate security mechanisms in current 
computer network systems are both the potential for loss of information critical to 
information security by malicious attacks and higher cost of operation. It means how 
effective or in what degree the IDS models can protect the system and identify malicious 
attacks from traffic connections. Operational requirements for intrusion detection 
mechanism are based on the need for rapid access to and dynamic sharing of information. 
At present, these requirements cannot be met without great risk of penetration and 
compromise. Higher costs of operation include costs due to separate computers for 
separate applications, restricting use of remote terminals, costs of physical protection of 
remote terminals and associated crypto devices, and the costs of clearing all user 
personnel to the highest level of classified information processed by a system. Pursuing 
the methods recommended in IDS will have significant effect in reducing these costs 
perhaps yielding a high reduction of the cost of network systems that handle the classified 
data.  
It would be simpler if the single user had complete control over his processing 
environment, including his data and programs. After a few years users began demanding 
better utilization of the resources. The response to this demand for more efficiency gave 
birth to multiplexing techniques,  
1.3 Research Hypotheses  
• Ambiguity and uncertainty problem can be solved by Fuzzy C-means (FCM) 
weighted k-NN reasoning Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) method.  
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• Unknown malicious attacks can be correctly classify by entropy function to 
improve the overall detection rate involving unknown abnormal behaviors in 
discovering intrusive behaviors. 
• Semi-supervised learning is used to help predictive model testing to reduce the 
cost and improve the performance by using both labeled data (usually small 
amount) and unlabeled data (usually large amount) for training.  
1.4 Proposed Approach 
We develop a novel soft computing method based on the fuzzy belief [21] in this paper 
for the classification of computer network traffic connections to detect unknown attacks 
efficiently and effectively in the IDS process. Our work is based on the fuzzy belief IDS 
structure, which combines the fuzzy set theory and DS theory to search for intrusive 
behaviors in network traffic connections, and then classify the intrusive behaviors into 
normal class or attack class. Nevertheless, the fuzzy belief classifier using combination of 
evidence under fuzzy environments can only recognize the normal and attack traffic 
connections that previously collected in the training data set.  
To overcome this drawback, we developed Fuzzy C-means (FCM) weighted k-NN 
reasoning DST classifier for detection of previously unknown intrusions when the 
available information is imperfect and ambiguous to be specifically defined as normal or 
attacks. One novel aspect of this classifier is that it can correctly classify novel malicious 
attacks by entropy function to improve the overall detection rate involving unknown 
abnormal behaviors in discovering intrusive behaviors. In addition, the other novel aspect 
of this classifier is that the decision rules generated by fuzzy reasoning weighted k-NN 
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method for probability assignment of focal element are treated as evidences which 
strengthen the deviation knowledge of unknown attacks from normal instances and 
known attacks. The combination of all the fuzzy k-NN focal elements is then combined 
using the generalized Dempster’s rule. The FCM rules generation process is similar to 
[14] and this classifier is to classify a network traffic connection into three categorize of 
normal access, one of known attacks or unknown attacks.  
1.5 Dissertation Organization 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II we review existing literature related 
to the issues involved in implementing IDS in computer networks. We begin by 
discussing evolutions of Intrusion Detection Mechanisms then followed by the current 
techniques used to improve the performance of IDS design of computer networks. 
Chapter III initially explains we propose fuzzy belief k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) 
classifier to solve intrusion detection uncertainty problems caused by ambiguous and 
limited data. This single classifier incorporates fuzzy clustering technique along with 
Dempster-Shafer theory into our intrusion detection scheme to handle the ambiguity of 
traffic connections. Also, the k-NN technique is applied to further speed up the intrusion 
detection process.   
Chapter IV introduces the DARPA KDD 99 data sets as our benchmark in our 
experiment to present the comparison results. 
Chapter V we propose an innovative fuzzy classifier for effectively detecting both 
unknown attacks and known attacks with insufficient or inaccurate training information.  
11 
 
Chapter VI we improve the overall network intrusion detection rate by proposing and 
using an innovative three-layer hierarchy multi-classifier detection scheme called 
ensemble classifier. 
Chapter VII draws the conclusions, presents the contribution of this dissertation, and lists 
future research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we review existing literature related to the issues involved in 
implementing intrusion detection systems (IDS) in computer networks. We begin by 
discussing evolutions of Intrusion Detection Mechanisms in Section 2.1. The current 
techniques used to improve the performance of IDS design of computer networks are 
described in details in Section 2.2.  
2.1 Evolutions of Intrusion Detection Mechanisms 
Because the problem of information security in computer-based systems became visible 
only with the development of and acceptance of resource sharing systems, there is long 
history of previous work started in 1967 on the Defense Science Board Task Force. The 
computer security was first convened that this Task Force would analyze the problem and 
recommends a research and development program that would provide solutions to the 
extant problems of that time. During the course of that work it was discovered that the 
problem was not well understood and as a consequence the final report prepared by the 
Task Force contained less in the way of a recommended R&D program than had 
originally been thought possible. The report did, however contain and extensive 
discussion of the scope of the problem as well as definitions of terminology that were 
sadly lacking at that time.  
There has been some efforts made by “tiger team” that have expended a moderate amount 
of energy in demonstrating the security inadequacy of both standard commercial systems 
and those modified to provide security controls. The value of “tiger teams” in testing 
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computer security is questionable because the results of the effort are highly dependent 
on the quality and experience of the personnel assigned to the teams. Even if corrections 
are made as a result of flaws found by a team, there is no assurance that all flaws have 
been found and corrected. The activities of the tiger team can only reveal system flaws 
and provide no basis for asserting that a system is secure in the event their efforts are 
unsuccessful. In the latter event, the only thing that can be stated is that the security state 
of the system is unknown.  
There has been some efforts made by “tiger team” that have expended a moderate amount 
of energy in demonstrating the security inadequacy of both standard commercial systems 
and those modified to provide security controls. The value of “tiger teams” in testing 
computer security is questionable because the results of the effort are highly dependent 
on the quality and experience of the personnel assigned to the teams. Even if corrections 
are made as a result of flaws found by a team, there is no assurance that all flaws have 
been found and corrected. The activities of the tiger team can only reveal system flaws 
and provide no basis for asserting that a system is secure in the event their efforts are 
unsuccessful. In the latter event, the only thing that can be stated is that the security state 
of the system is unknown.  
Various members of the Defense and Intelligence communities have funded a number of 
independent projects concerned with various aspects of computer security. In addition, a 
fairly major effort to provide security controls to a system that existed within a benign 
environment in the Intelligence community has taken place over the past four decades. 
While these controls are of interest and provide a certain degree of implementation of 
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security procedures, they did not address the question of providing technical security 
against malicious attack. 
Given the problems of current hardware and operating systems some users (SFGWC, 
AFLC) have been driven to the development of large software packages that mediate 
between applications programs and operating systems. Such packages are capable of 
providing a degree of security in a benign environment but exact a very large price for 
storage space and execution time. These packages seem to offer little protection against a 
hostile programmer or possible underlying trapdoors and may be employed to protect a 
small amount of classified data. Thus, their cost-effectiveness, at least, is subject to 
question.  
Anderson stated in 1980 that security audit trials can plan an important role in a security 
program for a computer system. As audit trails are presently structured on most machines, 
they are only useful primarily in detecting unauthorized access to files. For those 
computers, which have no access control mechanisms built into the primary operating 
systems, the audit trail bears the burden of detecting unauthorized access to system 
resources. As access control mechanisms are installed in the operating system, the need 
for security audit trail data will be even greater. It will not only be able to record 
attempted unauthorized access, but will be virtually the only method by which user 
actions which are authorized but excessive can be detected. 
In 1982, the Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has funded work at Rand 
Corporation, Information Systems Institute (USC) and Livermore Research Laboratories 
to analyze the security adequacy of selected commercial operating systems and to 
develop methodologies of security assurance. These programs have not been sufficiently 
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developed to provide any assessment of this potential contribution to the solution of some 
of the problems perceived by the computer security requirement at that time. Finally, the 
problem of computer security achieved major recognition from IBM’s announcement of 
their intention to spend 40 million dollars on the problem and it directed to the 
enhancement of IBM product, Resource Security System (RSS).  
Denning in 1987 proposed an intrusion detection model based on the hypothesis that the 
vulnerabilities of computer include abnormal behavior of authorized user. This represents 
a milestone in the research in the area of intrusion detection model. The model is rule-
based pattern matching model with the basic idea of monitoring the standard behavior on 
a computer system and searching for deviations in all the behaviors. There are no special 
features in this model. This IDES model can detect malicious attacks in real time with 
better performance. 
A trend pointed out with considerable emphasis by the Requirements Working Group is 
the movement towards the establishment of large dispersed networks of related computer 
systems. A F Global Weather Center, for example, will interconnect several of its own 
computer systems. In addition, this interconnected complex will be tied to other weather 
processing centers and to the command control system of SAC and MAC. SAC plans to 
tie several command control computers together, and may also interface intelligence 
processing systems. The MAC command control system, MACIMS, will be implemented 
as a network of WWMCCS computes. Plans are being formulated for a network to 
interconnect all of the WWMCCS computer installations. As networks of the types 
mentioned are developed, computer security problems, already difficult, become much 
more complex. For example, there is a possibility of untrustworthy processor in a 
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network collecting classified data from other processors by making apparently legitimate 
requests. Computer networks that have one or more nodes that can be accessed by users 
with clearances below the highest level of information in the network constitute 
multilevel networks. The security threat posed by such operation is that in general the 
compute to computer communications are accepted as valid on the questionable basis that 
the other computer has a high security reliability. However, if a malicious user can 
exercise control of a node, the entire network may be compromised. In a network, it is 
essential that there be reliable security controls, that the nature of these be understood, 
and the network does not inadvertently provide the means to bypass these controls. While 
there are growing requirements for interconnecting computer systems into networks the 
dimensions of the security problem are unknown. Much more information is needed on 
both the networks and their security requirements.  
2.2 Intrusion Detection Techniques 
In research area, there are many classifying algorithms used in IDS models. These 
techniques are typically based on the naïve Bayesian method [6,7], Support Vector 
Machine [8-11], Particle Swarm Optimization [12,13], Generic Algorithm [14], neural 
networks [15-18], k-nearest neighbor (KNN) methods [19,20], fuzzy c-means (FCM) 
methods [21,22], Dempster-Shafer Theory Of Evidence [23-26] or other decision-tree 
based ad-hoc methods [27]. These techniques are introduced in details in the following 
section. In particular, these techniques are developed as classifiers, which are used to 
classify or recognize whether the incoming Internet access is the normal access or an 
attack. 
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2.2.1 Naïve Bayesian  
The Naïve Bayesian classifier is based on conditional probabilistic to perform decision of 
a classification problem. It uses Bayes' Theorem [1] with independence assumptions, 
which assumes a set of features are conditionally independent of one another given a 
class. In this case, the Naïve Bayes classifier has only one single parent node and several 
children nodes with unknown class labels, and these nodes represent each variables or 
attributes in data.  When a set of classes are observed in the training data, the naive bayes 
classifier then assign an observed data to one of classes with highest probability. By 
applying Naïve Bayesian classifier to an intrusion detection task, a set of training network 
traffic data is given to find the prior probabilities for normal or a known class of attacks. 
As unseen network traffic arrives, the classifier then uses Bayes Theorem to decide which 
class the traffic should belong to. 
There are basically two types of classification model, the most widely used methods are: 
Decision trees model and Naïve Bayesian Model, NBC). The Naïve Bayesian Model is 
stemmed from the classical mathematics with strong mathematics background and stable 
classification results. At the same time, NBC needs less parameter and is less sensitive to 
insufficient and incomplete data.  Theoretically, NBC has lower error rate than other 
classifiers.  Yet in reality, Domingos and Pazzani [2] found NBC suffers from the 
consumption of each attribute is independent from each other.  This consumption is 
impossible in real life which effects the classification performance results in some degree. 
Under the circumstances of high dimensional attributes and more correlation attributes, 
NBC tends to have less detection rate than Decision trees classifier.   
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Kononenko [3] developed Semi-Naïve Bayesian classifier by dividing all the attributes 
into different groups where attributes in one group have no correlation to other groups.  
This means the attribute in one group is less independent to one on other groups.  He 
applied this classifier in 4 medical domains. In two domains, the performance of Semi-
Naïve Bayesian classifier has similar output with Naïve Bayesian classifier, and in other 
two domains, the Semi-Naïve Bayesian has better performance than Naïve Bayesian.  
Langley and Sage [4] decribed a revised algorithm called the selective Bayesian 
Classifier especially to solve the problem of high correlation data. This algorithm only 
select certain features to use for the final decision making process.  The forward selection 
method is used to modify the data by deleting less informative or redundant features to 
improve the detection rate, lower the error rate, and at the same time better worst-case 
time complexity.  
2.2.2 Neural Networks  
A backpropagation neural network uses a feedforward structure to solve classification 
problems by its supervised learning algorithm. It consists of a collection of processing 
units that are highly interconnected, and it also consists of one hidden layer like black 
box [5-9]. Tamura [10] stated that four-layered feedforward neural network with two 
hidden layers will reduce the hidden neurons to (N/2)+3 given N input-target relations 
exactly. He approved that four-layered feedforward neural network performs better than 
the three-layered feedforward network with less neurons and error rate.  
Razavi [11] provides a framework with computational budget dependent to mimic the 
real world computational optimization problem for testing the algorithm of Neural 
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Networks.  For the purpose of efficient and effective optimization, using more than one 
hidden layer in Neural Networks could be confusing, interference and time consuming.   
The single hidden layer Neural networks could clearly demonstrate that an efficient 
performance over multi layer Neural Networks without metamodels.  
The network weights are updated by using gradient-based optimization algorithm during 
the training period [12-14].  Single layer Neural Networks can improve the classification 
performance with exceptionally training speed, because the training in Neural Networks 
requires complex optimization with local minima. When the network converges to the 
local minima of error, the output layer of the network will show the result when data is 
fed into the input layer.  
Based on the data given for training, neural networks has the ability to learn how to 
process intrusion detection tasks. It acts as a computational model to process the network 
traffic information. By the use of training procedure, the neural network gains the 
knowledge to extract the normal and attack signatures from the provided data 
automatically. With its ability to generalize from learned data, the neural network 
performs generalization of attacks and fault tolerance to imprecise and uncertain 
information. At the end of the training procedure, the future network traffic are then 
identified as whether malicious attacks or normal usage behavior.  
2.2.3 Fuzzy Logics 
Fuzzy logics mimicking the human brain show a new way of inference and determination, 
and it tries to describe the uncertainty of some models to explain the powerful non-linear 
objects.  in 1965, Zadeh [15]described fuzzy sets as new concepts for fuzzy logics in 
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information and control area.  Fuzzy sets allow each element belong to more than one set 
of normal or attack with a belonging membership degree which breaks the traditional 
crisp binary belongings “yes” or “no”. It is also used in the alarm generation process to 
reduce the false alarms.  The membership degree is continuous value between 0 and 1, 
when the membership degree is 0 or 1 the fuzzy set has only two elements as the classical 
binary sets.  
In 1974 Mamdani [16] applied fuzzy logics on the control of steam machine and pot, 
which validate the performance of fuzzy control.  In 1977 Pappis [17] applied fuzzy 
logics into traffic control on cross road transportation area, and it reduced the average 
waiting car period by seven percent.  
Owen [18] created fuzzy rules to perform fuzzy logics as an adaptive expert intrusion 
detection system in computer networks. He categorized the input features as five 
membership grades: LOW, MEDIUM-LOW, MEDIUM, MEDIUM-HIGH, and HIGH, 
which are represented by numeric values.  There are many ways to define fuzzy rules, for 
example 
IF condition THEN consequent 
A probabilistic model was founded by Hooper’s using rule of combination of evidence as 
a non-Bayesian approach. This neutral zone classifier is very similar to the intuitionistic 
fuzzy logics (IFL) in concept [19], and the three partition including truth, falsehood, and 
indeterminacy first mentioned by J. H. Lambert [20] with the credibility of one evidence 
influenced by the opposite evidence of another. Then it was further investigated by 
Lukasiewicz to divide it into 0. ½, and 1 values. Koopman [21] originally presented the 
concept of upper and lower probability, and was followed by Shafer (1976) [22], who 
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extended it to the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions (DST) by proposing the 
Belief and Plausibility equations and applying the rule to combine two evidences. 
Lambert states three chances: chance p of accurate, chance q of mendacious and chance 
1-p-q of careless, whereas three components: accurate, mendacious, careless sum up to 1. 
Fuzzy logics with infinite levels between the intervals of [0, 1] are introduced by Zadeh 
[23]. 
2.2.4 K-Nearest Neighbor  
Non-parametric methods such as the voting k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) rule [3] have been 
used. However, one of the problems encountered when using this rule is the challenge of 
handling uncertainty due to insufficient and incomplete knowledge in identify network 
traffic into the normal or abnormal patterns.  Due to the uncertainty of intrusive belief 
value, the use of common approaches can potentially limit the capability of these 
techniques. For this reason, Keller [8] have incorporated some concepts of fuzzy sets 
theory into the voting k-NN procedure, and developed a fuzzy k-NN rule which has been 
used heavily for many years. In his fuzzy k-NN algorithm, the membership in each class 
of a traffic connection to be classified is determined by combining the membership 
values of its k nearest neighbors rather than a crisp class as in voting k-NN. In addition of 
ensuring more informative content of the classification results, this rule yields a lower 
error rate than voting k-NN. 
The k-NN classifier is simple but effective in many pattern classification applications. 
For an input to be classified, a number of k nearest training patterns are obtained based 
on the Euclidean distance measurement between the input and every training pattern. The 
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input is then simply assigned to the class by majority voting, i.e., the input is classified to 
the most frequent class label among the k nearest training patterns. However, a major 
drawback of k-NN algorithm is that the precision of classification may decrease if all 
selected k nearest training patterns are equally important without considering the 
differences of distances [7]. Furthermore, while processing an intrusion detection task, 
some of the intrusive patterns are similar to those of normal activities. The boundaries 
between those attacks and the normal behavior are always unclear. To eliminate this 
drawback, fuzzy k-NN classifier is proposed and fuzziness is introduced into it. It assigns 
multiple membership grades to classes rather than a single class by the use of the distance 
differences from the k nearest training patterns. The confidence values are in proportion 
to the correspondent membership grades that the input network traffic belongs to certain 
classes 
2.2.5 Dempster-Shafer Theory  
The Dempster-Shafter Theory (DST) [9] [10] [11] [12] has been used to resolve 
uncertainty of information in a decision process. In the combination process, data fusion 
and evidential reasoning methods have been used to achieve a better performance [3]. In 
[9], the classification problem was addressed from the point of view of the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence. In this approach, each of the k nearest neighbors of a pattern to 
be classified is considered as an item of evidence supporting certain hypotheses 
concerning the class membership of that pattern. This information is provided in the form 
of a belief structure, defined as a function of the distance between the pattern under 
consideration and its neighbor. In [13], Shafer’s theory was developed under the 
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condition that each belief structure mass function is defined over fuzzy subsets instead of 
crisp subsets. Yager [13] represented the evidence of each training pattern by a belief 
structure with fuzzy focal elements. The combination of the different structures is then 
performed using the generalized Dempster’s rule. Thus, if the the available information is 
imperfect and ambiguous, soft computing techniques such as evidential reasoning, and 
fuzzy logic must be adapted to handle such uncertainty and imprecision in classification 
process. To a large extent, intrusions are common to any computer network systems 
processing classified information and may be solved by well-understood techniques [4] 
2.2.6 Multiple Classifiers Systems 
Besides the notability of multiplicity among the base classifiers, the right choice of a 
combination method is also an important issue in creating a supreme performance. A 
variety of combination methods have been reported for combining the outputs of the base 
classifiers into an ensemble result. According to their characteristics, they can be 
classified as linear combination methods, non-linear methods, statistical-based methods, 
and computationally intelligent methods. Linear combination method is the simplest 
method to fuse base classifiers’ outputs together. Summation and average are the popular 
ways for the combination. Non-linear method such as majority voting is used when the 
output of classifier is ranked list of classes in accordance with the degree of belief on 
classes the input pattern belongs to.  
There are three topologies for ensemble classifier: cascading ensemble classifier, parallel 
ensemble classifier, and hierarchical ensemble classifier as shown in figure. The 
cascading ensemble classifier in figure 2.1 will pass on the first classifier result to the 
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second classifier to form the final output. The data flow looks like a chain in this 
cascading process.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 LAYOUT OF CASCADING STRUCTURE OF ENSEMBLE 
CLASSIFIER 
 
FIGURE 2.2 LAYOUT OF PARALLEL STRUCTURE OF ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER 
 
FIGURE 2.3 LAYOUT OF HIERACHICAL STRUCTURE OF ENSEMBLE 
CLASSIFIER 
 
Usually it is very difficult to select the second classifier to compensate the errors 
produced by the first classifier.  The parallel ensemble classifier in figure 2.2 is formed 
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by several paralleled base classifier and a combination method.  The final result is 
produced by combining these base classifier outputs through the combination method.  
Selecting the base classifier is very important in this parallel structure model so that each 
base classifier should compensate each other’s output.  A careful delicate combination 
method will improve the detection performance greatly in ensemble classifier. The 
hierarchical ensemble classifier in figure 2.3 is basically the combination of cascading 
and parallel structure.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3.SINGLE CLASSIFIER FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
In this chapter, we propose fuzzy belief k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) classifier to solve 
intrusion detection uncertainty problems caused by ambiguous and limited data. This 
single classifier incorporates fuzzy clustering technique along with Dempster-Shafer 
theory into our intrusion detection scheme to handle the ambiguity of traffic connections. 
Also, the k-NN technique is applied to further speed up the intrusion detection process.   
First, we introduce uncertainty problems that exist in the IDS process and its influence on 
the IDS design. Then we describe the integration of the fuzzy-C-mean clustering 
techniques by grouping similar traffic connections together, and D-S theory by 
combining evidences from class labels and distances of its k nearest neighbor pairs into 
our proposed single classifier to solve the uncertainty problem. 
3.1 Reasoning about Uncertainty is a Necessity 
Uncertainty exists in every event and happens unpredictably. For example, the police 
department does not get involved with every residence’s personal life. Whenever there 
are accidents or criminal events happened, the corresponding department or police officer 
would start to investigate the events or outlaws. That is to say, the accidents or criminal 
events only happen occasionally and unpredictably in some of the places in the world.  
Police officer could pay more attention to certain suspects and judge the criminal 
committers by his appearance or actions.  With the similar function of the police 
department, the intrusion detection mechanism would have to deal with uncertainty 
caused accordingly by the computer activities. The IDS identify the traffic connection as 
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normal or abnormal activities by the symptoms and effects of these activities. It could 
happen that the IDS identify the attack as normal activities by mistakes when there is no 
clear distinction between normal and abnormal activities for a computer user.  When the 
IDS identify the connection as normal or attack activities, the uncertainties exit in every 
step of the detection process.   
There are two types of uncertainty: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory means the 
uncertainty that inherently exists in events and is stochastically irreducible. While 
epistemic uncertainty happened due to the fact of lack of enough information of the 
system or environment. If more information or knowledge is collected about the system, 
it is possible to reduce the uncertainty degree. The problem of uncertainty in intrusion 
detection could be both of these types. There is no clear distinction between normal and 
abnormal activities for a computer user because sometimes activities seem similar to 
those of normal activities. Besides, there are inadequate and limited information observed 
by the monitoring tools and detection mechanisms.  
3.2 Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Modules 
The machine learning techniques are just trying to copy the human brain by the machines. 
Classification becomes very important steps in machine learning techniques, whose goal 
is to identify which part of the data are normal or attacks by using advanced algorithm to 
classify the crucial information automatically into two groups in this chapter. The 
proposed fuzzy belief k-NN classifier is to identify which traffic connections are normal 
connections or intrusion attacks.   
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By choosing the right methods to get the data subsets can greatly decrease the 
classification time and improve the detection rate of the malicious attacks. During 
selecting the data subsets, the decision rules are generated from the incoming traffic data 
sets. These rules are also used later on to the classification phase to help to test the 
selected data from the attacks. Then we map the result features of the data fusion steps of 
final decision.   
There are basically four models are described in the proposed ID platform. Through these 
models we can detect the incoming traffic from malicious attacks.  The incoming datasets 
we use the DARPA KDD 99 to mimic the normal activities and abnormal activities. 
There are so many different kinds of data sets in the whole world. But how to select the 
right purpose oriented datasets is the main task in the intrusion aware architecture. The 
following step would be how to abstract the features from all these interrelated data sets. 
In other words, the subsets of data play an important role for the following classification 
phase.  
Intrusion detection in fact is a classification task. In our work, the goal is to identify 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Probe attacks, User to Root (U2R) attacks, and Remote 
to Local (R2L) attacks from the intrusion detection benchmark data set, i.e. DARPA 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set KDD99. This chapter applies an intrusion 
detection technique, called fuzzy belief k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) anomaly detection by 
using k-NN technique to reduce the computation time in application to the computer 
networking system. The approach uses a combination of fuzzy clustering technique and 
Dempster-Shafer theory. Since both of them have merit of resolving the uncertainty 
problems caused by limited and ambiguous information during a decision process.  
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FIGURE  3.1 PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION STEPS 
There are two phases in our intrusion detection system: training phase and classification 
phase shown in figure 3.1.  
In the training phase, the fuzzy decision rules are generated from the training data. Then 
in the classification phase the network connection would be classified as normal or 
attacks based on this decision rule. Figure 3.2 shows the general four modules of the 
architecture of the proposed system.  
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Figure 3.2 FOUR MODULS 
 
• The first module is the Fuzzy Decision Rule module. The fuzzy decision rules are 
generated from the training data by using fuzzy c mean clustering algorithm. This 
can be used in the future work in the classification phase. 
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• The second module is Calculating Belief module. By calculating belief of each 
sub data sets, we assign each incoming traffic with the belief results using Mass 
function for each rule set. Also the distance from all the traffic connection in the 
training data sets are calculated by using k-NN rules.  
• The third module is the Classification module where Dempster Shafer Theory is 
used. It computes the probability to automatically extract evidences including 
normal or attack class from training network traffic data. Then we mingle the 
normal evidence and attack evidence together to one belief equation. Here two 
independent evidences can be fused into a single belief function Z. 
• The last module is the Decision Making module. We adapt Pignistic probability 
function here to classify attack behavior from network traffic data. 
3.3 Fuzzy Clustering  
3.3.1 General Formulation 
Let’s assume the available information in the training set from either USB or Wi-Fi 
contains N network traffic connections, and each of them is composed of n distinct 
features with positive numeric values. We denote the training set as T, the training 
connection as x,  
},,,,{ 321 nxxxxT =          (3.1) 
and the set of features in each connection as F.  
},,,,{ 321 nffffF =          (3.2) 
Data Clustering is trying to collect the same feature of attacks in one cluster, and obvious 
different with other features in other clusters. Fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm is the 
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soft partition of K-means clustering algorithm. Each membership is assigned to determine 
a certain degree of clustering which each data belongs to. Basically the main idea is to 
divide the n into c fuzzy groups and update the clustering center till reach some 
spectation.  
The class set is L and it includes a number of p possible classes. 
},,,,{ 321 nllllL =           (3.3) 
Because a training connection sometimes could not be crisply defined as normality or 
abnormality in classification, we apply fuzzy c-Means clustering technique to deal with 
the above uncertainty. When the clustering operation is finished, we can obtain a set of 
cluster centers C and a membership partition matrix U. within each row of U, i is the 
connection number of the training set. 
},,,,{ 321 pccccC =          (3.4) 
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Within a vector (connection) of U, pU iij ,,2,1];1,0[ =∀∈  the degree of membership of 
vector  ix  is in the cluster j. The membership grades are treated intuitively to be our 
degrees of confidence on classes that a connection can belong to. Consequently, we can 
build p decision rules from a connection and each one consists of a number of feature 
values F, a class label l, and a confidence value α. 
{ } α,,: qiUUU lFrwhererR =        (3.6) 
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In the training phase, the summation of the degrees of confidence on rules generated from 
a trainining data sets equals to 1.  
1
1
=∑
=
p
q
iqα           (3.7) 
where i is the connection number and j is the class number. The confidence values are in 
proportion to the correspondent membership grades that connection belongs to certain 
classes. 
In addition to the rules created from membership partition matrix U, a number of p rules 
are generated from the cluster centers. In each rule, the antecedent part includes n values 
of a cluster center and the corresponding class label. The degree of confidence is 
designated to 1 because we have full confidence that the cluster center should belong to 
that partitioned class without any doubt.  
{ } 1,,: == αqqCCC lcrwhererR           (3.8) 
Using equations 3.6 and 3.8, we generate (N+1) X p rules in rule set R. The evidence is 
used to assign beliefs to the result of training data. 
uU RRR ∪=               (3.9) 
Equation 3.10 shows the function of Fuzzy C-Means algorithm. The gaol is to minimize 
the the function j.  
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• ix is the i connection of the training set,  qc  is the center of cluster q, and iqu  is 
the membership grade of ix  in the cluster j with a value between 0 and 1.  
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•  denotes norm expressing the distance or similarity between any measured data 
and the cluster center.  
• qi cx − represents the deviation of data ix  with qc . And it shows the dissimilarity 
between ix and qc  of in cluster j. 
• The parameter β is a weighting exponent on fuzzy membership and ],1[ ∞∈∀β . β 
is the degree of fuzziness and it control the degree of membership grades. When β 
is 1 which is the minimum number, the Fuzzy C-Means is actually a hard c-
Means algorithm. Normally, its value is between 1.25 to 2. 
In order to get the minimum of j, we have the following equations 3.11&3.12. The 
membership grades iju  and cluster centers jc are calculated by the following expressions.   
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Fuzzy C-Means upgrade the cluster center to certain values by changing the cluster 
centers and membership grades. This upgrading stops when ε<−+ kiq
k
iqiq uu
1max   where ε 
is a selected threshold between 0 and 1, and k is the number of iterations.  
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Class with a higher membership grade belongs to the certain class (closer to the cluster 
center), and the class with a lower membership grade doesn't belong to the certain class 
(further to the cluster center). The fuzzy C mean algorithm is shown as below.  
 
FIGURE 3.3 FCM EXAMPLE 
Algorithm: Fuzzy C Means 
Step1: Generate U and V 
Step 2: At k-iteration, obtain centers vectors ][ q
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Step 3: Update 1+kk andUU  
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Step 4: if then STOP;  
Otherwise return to step 2 
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3.3.2 An Example 
For example:  There are the following node of 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11 shown in figure 3.3. 
And we have initial centroid 3 & 11. Here we let σ=2 in equation 3.12, and the following 
equation 3.13 should be held.  
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For node 2 which is the 1st element, we use the equation to calculate the membership of 
1st node to 1st cluster which is: 
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Then we have the membership of 1st node to 2nd cluster which is  
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For node 3 which is the 2nd element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 2nd node to 1st cluster which is: 
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Then the membership of 2nd t node to 2nd cluster which is %022 =U  
For node 4 which is the 3rd element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 3rd node to 1st cluster which is: 
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Then we have the membership of 3rd node to 2nd cluster which is 
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For node 7 which is the 4th element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 4th node to 1st cluster which is: 
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Then we have the membership of 4th node to 2nd cluster which is 
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For node 9 which is the 5th element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 5th node to 1st cluster which is: 
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Then the membership of 5th node to 2nd cluster which is 
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For node 10 which is the 6th element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 6th node to 1st cluster which is: 
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FIGURE 3.4 NODES WITH DISTANCE TO THE CENTROID AND NEW 
CENTROIDS 
 
Then the membership of 6th node to 2nd cluster which is 
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For node 11 which is the 7th element, we use the equation again to calculate the 
membership of 7th node to 1st cluster which is:  
%071 =U  
Then the membership of 7th node to 2nd cluster which is:  
%10072 =U  
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Then we have all the nodes with distance to the centroid node 3 and 11 in the figure 3.4. 
We update the new Centroids: new centroid: 7.25 and new centroid: 6. 
3.4 Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The evidence of incoming traffic is unavaible for attacks or normal behaviors. Also, the 
training set data is not efficient enough to provide accurate information. Thus, the D-S 
theory is used into this classification phase to solve the limited information for training 
data. We don’t need to classify the traffic based on the previous consumption of the 
training data sets. The probability is calculated through this theory. Usually the attacks 
are hiding in the traffic data and are not easy to find out. This D-S theory can make 
decisions on data whether its normal or attack with limited information provided. In this 
phase, the pieces of evidences will be derived from the decision rules of the training 
phase. Here, we apply k-NN rule to find the most informative k nearest training 
connections of v. By using these k connections, we then can find the corresponding 
decision rules. Also, we use weighted k-NN rule to assign different weights w to these 
rules in order to differentiate the degrees of importance. 
3.4.1 K Nearest Neighbor Rule 
Now let’s assume v be an incoming connection to be classified. In order to classify it into 
the correct class, D-S theory is used to measure and combine pieces of evidence derived 
from the set of decision rules. This theory starts by defining the set of class labels L as the 
frame of the problem domain. The possible subset A of L represent hypothesis that one 
could present evidence. To classify v means to assign it to one of members in L.  
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For classifying v into the correct class, we treat the set of decision rules as pieces of 
evidence that alters our degrees of belief on which class v should belong to. If the 
distance is large between v and a decision rule, it implies that the rule only has a little 
influence on v. On the other hand, we have stronger belief that v should belong to the 
same class of the rule if v is “close” to it, which means the distance has a smaller value.  
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All the distances are calculated from v to all rules. ix is the 
thi  rule, kx  is the farthest rule, 
1x is the nearest rule of v, d is the Euclidean distance from v and to decision rule. The 
influence is assigned to each v. The factor is bigger means the rule is closer to v, and the 
factor is smaller means the rule is further to v. We try to find out the nearest neighbor of 
v with the weight value of 1. And the furthest neighbor of v with weight value of 0. So 
this factor value is between 0 and 1.  
3.4.2 Dempster Shafer Theory 
Dempster-Shafer theory describes the sample space as evidence or belief functions. We 
use class labels L as the length of the sample space domain. The subset A of L is the 
hypothesis supporting evidence. So A and null set φ  is a power set and denoted as 2L. Let 
v be the classification traffic data. We try to classify v to one of the  p classes in levels L. 
qlv∈ , q = 1, 2, …, p.  We use the mass function denoted as ( )m ⋅  as mapping function for 
m: 2L→ [0, 1], so we have  
∑
⊆
=
LA
Am 1)(           (3.26) 
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0)( =φm           (3.27) 
where A⊆L is a focal element of m if m(A) > 0. The quantity m(A) is probability which is 
a portion of evidences.  
By adapting Dempster-Shafer theory, the degree of belief is quantified by mass function 
which is denoted as m.  
α⋅= wlm q )(           (3.28) 
where q is the class number. Up to this stage, each rule creates a belief assignment 
indicating the degree that v belongs to a certain class. Nevertheless, we need to notice 
that a belief should also be designated to the frame (with every class labels). The reason 
is that only part of our beliefs is committed to single classes for a given training 
connection, and the rest of our belief should be assigned to the whole class set. According 
to Dempster-Shafer theory, the summation of all mass functions inferred from one 
training connection is equal to 1. Thus, the belief belonged to the frame becomes one 
minus the summation of beliefs of all single classes.  
∑
=
−=
p
i
qi lmLm
1
)(1)(             (3.29) 
Generally speaking, the mass function is a piece of evidence that supports certain 
hypothesis concerning to the class member of a rule. When more evidences appear with 
same class label, these evidences can be integrated to generate a single belief function 
which represents the total support for the same class. Now assume that there are two mass 
functions m1 and m2 induced by distinct items of evidences X and Y. By using Dempster 
Rule of Combination, these two independent evidences can be fused into a single belief 
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function that expresses the support of the hypotheses in both evidences. The combination 
result is called orthogonal sum of m1 and m2 and noted as m = m1 ⊕ m2. 
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Based on the equation 3.28, the belief function Bel and plausibility function Pl are used 
to show hypotheses. We have 
 
FIGURE 3.5 FUNCTION OF BELIEF AND PLAUSIBILITY 
)()( qq lmlBel =                                     (3.30) 
and 
)(1)( qq lbellpl −=                              (3.31) 
where q is class number and ql  is the hypothesis. Belief function can be regarded as a 
lower bound of the evidence. Plausibility is an upper bound on the belief. We can see the 
bel is the lower boundary and the pl is the upper boundary of hypothesis. The gap 
between is the uncertainty part of evidence in Figure 3.5. 
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Function of Believe and Plausibility 
Two mass functions m1 and m2 can be fused into a single belief function. The 
combination result is noted as m = m1 ⊕ m2 
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The factor 1k −  is the renormalization constant. We use the equation 3.32 to generate the 
final belief of a single class. The two belief functions Bel(N) and Bel(A) can be generated 
through the above evidence.  
3.4.3 Decision Making 
After having all the fused mass functions, the final decision is made by introducing the 
pignistic probability function. It is illustrated as follows: 
p
LmlmlBp qq
)()()( +=           (3.34) 
where q is the class number and p is the number of classes. The function quantifies our 
beliefs to individual classes with pignistic probability distribution. For making an optimal 
decision, v is assigned to a class with the highest pignistic probability. Hence, the 
incoming patterns of information can be classified as intrusion or non-intrusion activities. 
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3.4.4 An Example 
The mass functions is 0.15 for normal class, and the mass function is 0.2 for attack class. 
According to equations 3.30 and 3.31, the belief for normal class is 0.15, and the 
plausibility for normal class is 0.8. For the attack class, the belief is 0.2 and the 
plausibility is 0.85. 
Let 15.0)(1 =Nm   and 2.0)(1 =Am   
According to equations )()( qq lmlBel =   and )(1)( qq lbellpl −= , we calculate the belief 
and plausibility.  
15.0)()( 1 == NmNBel         (3.35) 
2.0)()( 1 == AmABel          (3.36) 
8.02.01)(1)(1)( =−=−=−= ABelNBelNPl      (3.37) 
85.015.01)(1)(1)( =−=−=−= NBelABelAPl      (3.38) 
65.001580.0)()()( =−=−= NPlNBelNUn      (3.39) 
65.020.085.0)()()( =−=−= APlABelAUn      (3.40) 
The frame is  
{ } { }ANllL ,, 21 ==          (3.41) 
Then we add two more pieces of evidence mass functions are 0.25 and 0.7 for normal 
class and attack class, respectively.  Let 2 ( ) 0.25m N =  and 2 ( ) 0.7m A =  
Table 3.1 shows the Connection where normal  is denoted by N and attack is denoted by 
A.  The gap between belief and plausibility is denoted as U.  
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First, the factor 1k −  is calculated. Then the fused mass functions can be calculated by 
using Equation 3.43. Equations 3.44 to 3.46 are the final results.   
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The plausibility and gap between belief and plausibility for both normal and attack 
classes can be derived using Equations 3.47 to 3.52. 
25.0)()( 2 == NmNBel         (3.47) 
73.0)()( 2 == AmABel         (3.48) 
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The gap between belief and plausibility is 0.08. Now we can see when we add two more 
evidence to it, the gap reduced from 0.65 to 0.08, which shows that this connection 
should be attack.  
The degrees of final belief on normal and attack classes are shown in equation 3.53&3.54. 
Table 3.2 is the final result. 
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)()()( =+=+= LmAmABp                                                    (3.54) 
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Table 3.1 CONNECTION 
    
    
    
    
 
 
Table 3.2 RESULTS 
 {N} {A} {N,A} 
 0.15 0.2 0.65 
 0.15 0.2 1 
 0.8 0.85 1 
 0.25 0.7 0.05 
 0.25 0.7 1 
 0.3 0.75 1 
 0.25 0.73 0.04 
 0.25 0.73 1 
 0.27 0.75 1 
 0.02 0.02  
 0.27 0.75  
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CHAPTER 4 
4.EVALUATION OF FUZZY BELIEF K-NN SINGLE CLASSIFIER 
 
In this chapter, we introduce the DARPA KDD 99 data sets as our benchmark in our 
experiment.   
4.1 DARPA KDD99 Data Set 
It is very hard to generate large amount of computer networking data to test our classifier. 
Therefore, we use the existing data set to train and test our system. In order to compare 
with other researchers result, we choose not to simulate the data by ourselves. As we 
know it needs a lot of work to simulate the attacks within a network environment. 
DARPA KDD99 Intrusion Detection Evaluation data are used in my dissertation as a 
benchmark for analyzing the performance of the proposed classifiers. It was first 
generated by MIT lab to monitor the network traffic for two weeks. It has been used by 
many researchers to test their IDS and its open to public with large number of network 
traffic activities including attacks and normal. There are three sets in KDD99 data: whole 
KDD, 10% KDD, and corrected KDD. In this dissertation, the 10% KDD data is used as 
training set, and the corrected KDD data is used as testing set.  The patterns the 
classification use to detect attacks are basically the features of the data. We can select less 
correlated feature subsets to strengthen the patterns distinguishing in the machine 
learning process.  Mapping is also an important step to link the input data to the 
corresponding features. 
 
49 
 
TABLE 4.1 CONNECTION DISTRIBUTION 
Data Set Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Total 
Training Set 97,277 391,458 1,126 52 4,107 494,020 
Testing Set 60,593 229,853 16,189 228 4,166 311,029 
 
TABLE 4.2 THIRTY NINE ATTACKS 
 
DoS R2L U2R Probe 
apache2, back, ftp_write,guess_passwd, buffer_overflow, ipsweep, mscan, 
land, mailbomb, imap, multihop, named, httptunnel, nmap, portsweep, 
netpune, pod, phf, sendmail, loadmodule, perl, saint, satan. 
processtable, snmpgetattack, ps, rootkit,  
smurf, teardrop, snmpguess, spy, sqlattack, xterm.  
udpstorm. warezclient, warezmaster,   
 worm, xlock, xsnoop.   
4.2 Data Sets Selection 
The KDD99 data set that is made up of a large number of network traffic connections. 
Each connection is represented with 41 features plus a label of either normal or a type of 
attack. Totally 39 attack types are included and are fall into four main classes, DoS, 
Probe, U2R, and R2L. There are 22 types of attacks in training set and 17 types of attacks 
in testing sets. Table 4.1 shows the training set and testing set connection respectively. 
Table 4.2 shows the 22 types of attacks in training set are marked underline. Figure 4.1 
shows the distributions of DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. As we can see here the 
DoS and Probe attacks are very common in computer networking traffic connections, 
while U2R and R2L attacks are very rare in computer networking traffic connections. 
The distribution of these four attacks are not even in Darpar KDD 99 data sets.  
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FIGURE 4.1 DISTRIBUTIONS OF FOUR KDD99 ATTACK CATEGORIES: 
                                      : Training Sets                     : Testing Sets  
4.3 Data Sets Preprocessing  
The fuzzy belief experiments are performed on the binary (normal/attack) classification. 
Our two-stage classifier and ensemble classifier experiments are performed on multi-
label classification. To minimize the inaccuracy and variation factor of experiment results, 
10 trials are performed in every detection task. In each trial, only a very small amount of 
connections are randomly selected from reduced training and testing sets. It not only 
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speeds up the classification process but also simulates the uncertainty caused by lack of 
network traffic information. 
For the binary classification, the four training sets have 545 DoS attacks, 213 Probe 
attacks, 52 U2R attacks, and 99 R2L attacks, respectively and each set has a number of 
878 normal connections. The four testing sets have 235 DoS attacks, 268 Probe attacks, 
215 U2R attacks, and 291 R2L attacks, respectively and each set has 479 normal 
connections. The sizes of the original training and testing sets are reduced by removing 
the duplicated connections in Table 4.3.  
4.4 Features in Data Sets 
The set describes each connection in terms of 41 features plus a label of either normal or 
a type of attack as shown in table 4.4. The features is the same with the attributes to 
describe each connections in the networking traffic. The content of these features are 
continuous, discrete, or symbolic with vary scales and ranges. These features can be 
classified into four classes, basic, content, time-based, and host-based features. Features 
1 to 9 are basic features that are derived from packet header without inspecting the 
payload. Features 10 to 22 are content features that are obtained by analyzing the payload 
of the original TCP packets. Features 23 to 31 are time-based traffic features that capture 
properties of connections in the past 2 seconds. Features 32 to 41 are host-based traffic 
features that examine a number of connections using a window of 100 connections 
instead of a 2-second time window. For example, the protocol_type feature shows the 
traffic connection belongs to Ethernet, local talk, token ring, FDDI, or ATM. The 
duration feature shows the period that the connection last.  
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TABLE 4.3 REDUCED TRAINING AND TESTING SETS 
 Total  Normal  DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Training Sets  1787 878 545 213 52 99 
Testing Sets 1488 479 235 268 215 291 
 
TABLE 4.4 41 FEATURES IN KDD 99 DATA SETS 
Feature# + Feature Name Feature# + Feature Name 
1 duration  22 is guest login 
2 protocol type  23 count 
3 service  24 serror rate 
4 src byte  25 rerror rate 
5 dst byte 26 same srv rate 
6 flag  27 diff srv rate 
7 land  28 srv count 
8 wrongfragment  29 srv serror rate 
9 urgent  30 srv rerror rate 
10 hot  31 srv diff host rate 
11 num failed logins 32 dst host count 
12 logged in  33 dst host srv count 
13 num compromised  34 dst host same srv count 
14 root shell  35 dst host diff srv count 
15 su attempted  36 dst host same src port rate 
16 num root  37 dst host srv diff host rate 
17 num file creations  38 dst host serror rate 
18 num shells 39 dst host srv serror rate 
19 num access shells  40 dst host rerror rate 
20 num outbound cmds  41 dst host srv rerror rate 
53 
 
4.5 Experimental Result Expression 
For detecting the attacks, training and testing are performed in each trial. In the training 
phase, our proposed method and other methods are constructed using the limited and 
ambiguous training data. The testing data are then fed into the trained classifier to 
identify intrusions in the testing phase. We evaluate the performances using false positive 
rate (FPR) and detection rate (DR), and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graphs. 
The false positive rate is the percentage of normal connections that are incorrectly 
identified as attacks. The detection rate is the percentage of attacks that are correctly 
identified.  The ROC graphs that plot FPRs on the X axis and DRs on the Y axis. In the 
tasks of detecting attacks, the differences in both FPRs and DRs are very slight for 
different kinds of classifiers. Since DoS and Probe attacks usually have frequent 
sequential patterns that are different from the normal connections, they can be easily 
separated from normal activities and thus all of three classifiers can achieve low FPRs 
and high DRs. On the contrary, U2R and R2L attacks do not have any intrusion only 
frequent sequential patterns. They are embedded in the data portions of the packets and 
normally involve only a single connection. Therefore, most machine learning approaches 
would fail to achieve high DRs in U2R and R2L attacks. Although some classifiers have 
very low FPRs, it is because they treat most network traffic data as normal connections 
either they are normal or malicious activities.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5.TWO-STAGE FUZZY KNN-DST CLASSIFIER FOR UNKNOWN ATTACKS 
 
In this chapter, an innovative fuzzy classifier is proposed for effectively detecting both 
unknown attacks and known attacks with insufficient or inaccurate training information. 
The motivation for two-stage fuzzy classifier is introduced in section 5.1. Section 5.2, 
describes the proposed two-stage fuzzy KNN-DST IDS in detail. Firstly, a fuzzy C-
means (FCM) algorithm is employed to softly compute and optimize clustering centers of 
the training datasets with some degree of fuzziness counting for inaccuracy and 
ambiguity in the training data. Subsequently, a distance-weighted k-NN (k nearest 
neighbors) classifier, combined with the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST), is introduced to 
assess the belief functions and pignistic probabilities of the incoming data associated with 
each of known classes. Finally a two-stage intrusion detection scheme is implemented 
based on the obtained pignistic probabilities to determine if the input data are normal, one 
of the known attacks or an unknown attack. At second stage both neutral zone and 
entropy function are applied to detect unknown attacks. The experimental results show in 
section 5.3 that the new algorithm with entropy function outperforms algorithm with 
neutral zone and other intrusion detection algorithms and is especially effective in 
detecting unknown attacks. Section 5.4 draws some conclusions on our proposed method 
of two-stage classifier for detection unknown attacks. 
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FIGURE 5.1 TWO-STAGE CLASSIFYING SCHEMES FOR UNKNOWN ATTACK 
DETECTION 
5.1 Introduction 
Basically, there are mainly two types of IDS: anomaly intrusion detection and misuse or 
signature-based intrusion detection. Anomaly intrusion detection tries to identify if the 
data traffic pattern is abnormal by comparing it with previously obtained normal traffic 
profiles; while the misuse methods detect intrusions by matching the data signature or 
feature vector to that of one of the known attacks.  Although theoretically capable to 
detect unknown attacks, anomaly IDS are generally inefficient, time-consuming and very 
difficult to implement with poor performance due to the lack of training data.  On the 
other hand, misuse IDS are very efficient in data classification, but they can only detect 
known attacks and suffer from high error detection rate especially when the attacks are 
unknown or the classifier is not properly or sufficiently trained. Most of current IDS 
algorithms are based on modern classification methods.  
Training data
Find the error-tolerant “soft” 
centers of each known 
classes using semi-
supervised FCM algorithm 
Test data
Evaluate the belief values of 
the data on each of known 
classes using a “soft” KNN-
DST classifier 
Stage 1 classification:
normal data/attack
Stage 2 classification:
known/unknown attack
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The current classifying algorithms used in IDS are typically designed based on the naïve 
Bayesian method [6,7], support vector machine [8-11], particle swarm optimization 
[12,13], generic algorithm [14], neural networks [15-18], k-nearest neighbor (KNN) 
methods [19,20], fuzzy c-means (FCM) methods [21,22], Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence [23-26] or other decision-tree based ad-hoc methods [27]. However, the 
detection performance of the current IDS are generally sensitive to the mismatching 
between the training and test data; and they could perform very poorly in the case of 
slight deviation of intrusive data pattern from known patterns or of an unknown attack. It 
is well-known that the forms of cyber attacks and internet hacking tactics are constantly 
changing and evolving and new internet “viruses” are created almost every day. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the performance of IDS is not markedly degraded when a 
known intrusion is morphed into a different form of attack or a new intrusion has a 
completely different profile.  In this work, we will introduce an innovative two-stage 
fuzzy classifier embedded with “soft” and error-tolerant classification mechanism for 
effective detection of various malicious intrusions including unknown attacks.  Fuzzy 
classifiers are known for tolerating training or test data errors or variations due to “soft” 
clustering and classification techniques involved, but none of the current fuzzy classifiers 
is capable to effectively detect both known and unknown attacks simultaneously. In 
addition, with this proposed IDS, the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [28] is seamlessly 
combined with a distance-weight k-NN algorithm by fusing multiple “soft” independent 
evidences in order to assess the belief value of the input data belonging to each of the 
known classes. The two-stage classification in the algorithm is set firstly to determine 
whether the incoming traffic is normal or an attack and subsequently to determine 
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whether it is an unknown attack if the first stage detection is positive as abnormal 
connections.  
5.2 A  New Fuzzy KNN-DST Classifier for Unknown Intrusion Detection 
The framework of the proposed fuzzy KNN-DST classifier is shown in Figure 5.1. Since 
the new classifier should be capable to detect unknown intrusions and mutated versions 
of known intrusions, we choose to use the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) algorithm for its 
robust performance and its tolerance for inaccuracy and random errors in the input data. 
In our developed new algorithm, a belief value of a test connection associated with a 
known class is softly measured based on the distance between the input data and the 
centroid of the class, and the Dempster-Shafter Theory (DST) is incorporated into the 
framework to fuse multiple evidences generated from a weighted k-NN algorithm to form 
a pignistic probability of a test connection belonging to a known class.  The centers of 
known classes are softly defined and computed using a semi-supervised fuzzy c-means 
(FCM) algorithm from the training data.   
Stage one classification in Figure 5.1 determines if a connection is normal data or an 
intrusion. If it is an abnormal intrusion, stage-two classification is needed to determine if 
it is one of known attacks or unknown attack. The details of the new classifier are given 
in the next two subsections. 
5.2.1 Semi-Supervised Fuzzy C-Means Learning Algorithm 
Let us assume the training set { }NxxxxX ,...,,, 321=  contains N network traffic 
connections, and each of them is either normal connection or known attack. Each 
connection is represented by a distinct feature vector with positive numeric values. 
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Normally for computer network connections, the extracted feature vector consists of the 
source and destination bytes, the connection type, or the duration of a connection, and etc. 
The set of features generated from all data connections are assumed to be: 
{ }NffffF ,...,,, 321=          (5.1) 
We denote the set } ,...,,{ 21 Plll=L as P possible data classes, which include known attacks 
and the normal data stream. To avoid the crisp definition of a connection belonging to 
one of the classes, we employ the FCM algorithm allowing one traffic connection to 
belong to more than one class/cluster with varying membership values.  
Firstly, we will try to divide the N traffic connections into P clusters/classes and each 
cluster is represented by its centroid, which is an element of { }PcccC ...,,, 21= . In addition, 
a membership partition matrix U of size (N×P) is used to measure the closeness of a data 
connection to each of the class centers. The membership matrix elements are defined by: 
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where  of a value between 0 and 1 is the membership grade of the input data 
connection i in the cluster q, β (β >1) is the weighting exponent representing the degree 
of the fuzziness for the membership grades, and ||,|| qi cf  represents the Mahalanobis 
distance between the data feature vector if  and the centroid qc of cluster q and is defined 
as: 
)()(||,|| 1 qiq
T
qiqi cfΣcfcf −−=
−        (5.3) 
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where qΣ is the covariance matrix of the centroid vector of cluster q. Equation 5.3 
becomes the Euclidean distance when qΣ  is the unity matrix.  
The centroid of cluster q is further defined as:  
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The cluster centroids are iteratively optimized by minimizing the following dissimilarity 
function J(U,C): 
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With the FCM algorithm, we keep on upgrading qc and  iteratively until the 
dissimilarity function J(U,C) is minimized.  The optimal cluster centroids qc  for the 
fuzzy classifier are found when the iteration stops with εηη <−+ )()1(
,
max iqiqqi uu , where ε is a 
pre-selected threshold between 0 and 1, and is the number of iterations.   The initial 
values of the cluster centroids in (5.2) are obtained from the labelled training data directly. 
Therefore, the iterations in (5.2)-(5.5) normally can converge quickly. Since the class 
information of the labelled training data is used in the FCM algorithm, the learning 
process is considered to be semi-supervised. 
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5.2.2 A Two-Stage KNN-DST Classifier  
With the centroids of the known clusters found through the Fuzzy C-means algorithm, we 
try to employ a weighted k-NN approach in our classifier by considering the k-nearest 
neighbors of a new test data connection xv in the training dataset. Let us associate the test 
data connection xv with the class lq of one of the k-nearest neighbors fq by defining a 
fuzzy membership function based on the distance between the test data and the class 
centroid cq that is similar to (5.2).   
However, the association between the test data and class lq also should be affected by the 
distance between the test data xv and the training neighbor fq.  If there is a large distance 
between vx  and one of the k-nearest training records, the probability of vx  and the 
training record belonging to the same class is small. Therefore, the membership grade of 
a test data record belonging to a class should be weighted based on the distance between 
the test data and its nearest neighbors in the k-NN algorithm.  
We assume that  the K nearest neighboring training data records of vx are represented by 
the set of their feature spaces },,,{ 21 KK fffF =  and },,,,,,{ 21 Kvvv ffffff   is the set 
of the corresponding distances between the test data feature vf  and the K nearest training 
samples kf  in ascending order. Hence, the membership grade of a test data record 
belonging to a class in the weighted k-NN algorithm should be weighted with the 
following coefficient.  





=
≤≤≠
−
−
=
  ,,                         ,1
1  ,,,  ,
,,
,,
1
1
1
vvK
vvK
vvK
vrvK K
w
ffff
ffff
ffff
ffff
γ
γ
     
(5.6) 
61 
 
where 1f is the first nearest neighbor of vf  and kf is the  nearest neighbor of  and  the 
weight  is assigned to modify the association between the connection vf  and the class of  
its  nearest neighbor. The closer the neighbors are, the greater weights they are 
assigned to. In the weighted k-NN algorithm, each of the k nearest neighbors and its class 
designation contribute to the classification by providing an independent piece of evidence. 
Since DST is an evidence theory that can be used to combine separate pieces of evidence 
to determine the probability of an incident [24], we will use the DST in our classifier to 
fuse the class information obtained from all k-nearest neighbors to facilitate the intrusion 
detection work.  The goal is to try to classify the new connection vf  into one of the 
members in class label set },,2 ,1{ PL = .  
DST describes the probability of a test data sample belonging to a class using belief 
functions and the degree of belief is quantified by a mass function denoted as m. The term 
 of γf  can be treated as a piece of evidence that contributes to our belief that vf  
belongs to class .  Since only a part of our belief is committed to  and represented by
, the rest of the belief is assigned to the whole frame of discernment represented 
by .  Specifically, the belief functions of the input data connection vf  belonging to 
class  and the whole frame L due to the evidence from one of its neighbor γf  are 
defined, respectively, as: 
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where q is the class number, vqu is the fuzzy membership grade of vf  associated with 
class and is used to measure the belief of vf  belonging to class , and ζ is a fixed 
factor used to normalize the total mass function. 
Since there are K nearest neighbors },2 ,1,{ K=γγf of vf , each of them can be treated as 
a piece of evidence supporting our belief that vf belongs to class lq. By using the 
Dempster Rule of Combination [28], we can fuse the mass functions of all k-nearest 
neighbours γf  belonging to the same class  to form a combined mass function through 
orthogonal sum of the mass functions, represented as
)()()()( 21 qKqqqq lmlmlmlm ⊕⊕⊕=><  . Based on the mass functions that are assigned 
to class q for all training data connections },,2 ,1,{ K=γγf in the K nearest neighbors, 
the combined mass functions for the data sample assigned to class q and the whole frame 
L  are given, respectively, by: 
∏
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The difference between our work and the classifying algorithm in [24] is that, as shown 
in (5.9) and (5.10), all K neighbors rather than a subset of the K neighbors contribute to 
the belief that the test sample belongs to class lq, making the classification more tolerable 
to training/test data variations.  
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A global mass function is further defined by considering all possible classes for the test 
data sample vf  in estimating the belief value of the sample belonging to class lq. Hence, 
the global mass functions )()()( 1 Pvqvvv lmlmlmm ⊕⊕=  of the test sample belonging 
to class lq and the whole frame L are modified as: 
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where H is the normalizing factor, given by: 
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The belief function Bel is widely used to measure the credibility of a hypothesis in 
classifying a test data sample. One can assign the mass function in (11) to )( qv lBel as the 
probability of the input data sample vx belonging to class ql . In this work, considering the 
inaccuracy and randomness in test/training data, we will apply the pignistic probability, 
which includes a measure of plausibility for more tolerance of test/training data 
inaccuracy in the classification.  The pignistic probability BetP for an input sample vx  
belonging to class  is defined as: 
Pq
P
LmlmlBetP vqvqv ,,2,1 ,
)()()( =+=       (5.14) 
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6.2.2.1 Second-Stage Classification for Unknown Attacks by Neutral Zone 
There may have a case where none of the belief values have a confident possibility of 
belonging to any of the existing class labels.  In other words, some of the connections are 
too ambiguous to be assigned to any of the existing classes. In this situation, we may 
want to classify these connections into a new class label by using neutral zone [16].  
After our FCM k-NN DST classifier process, the ideal classification for belief value to 
the correct corresponding class set is further defined. When the maximum pignistic 
probability of   of the sample connections is more close to value 1, it means 
these connection samples are definitely belonging to the class . Those values of 
 that are more close to value 0 might not belong to any of the class labels . 
Those values of  that fall between 0 and has more possibility of 
not being a member of any of the existing class but that of a new type of unknown attack 
class.  The  value of 0.5 is the crossover point of neutral zone data set. Any 
 value greater than 0.5 implies that the connection definitely is the member of 
the class label . As the  value goes below 0.5, it is less likely that the 
connection is a member of any of the existing class label . 
In order to further evaluate the quality of DST belief assignment, the difference between 
the two maximum belief values of each network traffic 
connection to the certain class can be considered. If the value of this difference is large a 
connection can be assigned clearly to one of the class. If the value of this difference is 
small a connection belongs to both classes to the same degree and its assignment is very 
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ambiguous. In this case, new network traffic connections with ambiguous class 
distribution need further classification to get a better result. Neutral zone concept is 
applied here to separate these connections as unknown attacks from the attacks result of 
output data from the FCM Weighted k-NN DST classifier.  
For example, A={(a 0), (b 0.5), (c 0.7)} and B={(a 1), (b 0.5), (c 0.3)} are fuzzy sets in 
which a, b, and c have membership degrees in the set of A of 0, 0.5, and 0.7, and B of 1, 
0.5, and 0.7 respectively. So it’s absolutely true that a belongs to class B. But b and c are 
only partial members in the class A or B. Especially b with the same membership to class 
A and B which will cause the vagueness and insufficient of evidence of the classification.  
Note that the output classifier defined by our classifier is ambiguous if for two different 
output classes belief value for has the same value or very close value. 
To avoid this ambiguous classification in a case where the belief values are not equal but 
very close to each other, the uncertainty margin can be explored here. This 
ambiguous belief values of new connections to all classes indicate that this connection 
does not belong to any of the existing known classes, and it belong to unknown attack 
classes.  Let  and  denote the two largest belief values of 
the sample traffic connection v. If the two largest memberships of some vectors are close 
to each other, we group these vectors to the neutral zone as the class of unknown attacks. 
Mathematically, instances for a single vector v can be characterized by the following 
condition in the flowing equation.  
      (5.15) 
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We use  as user-defined threshold to further determine the output data of FCM 
Weighted k-NN DST classifier belongs to the neutral zone subset (where unknown 
attacks class has been classified).  It might not be desirable to mix all the output vectors 
from the result of our classifier by using different classifier just to decrease the detection 
rate or generate false alarms. The problem is how to obtain the threshold . In this paper 
is specified through a fixed percentage of the neutral zone traffic connections by our 
FCM K-NN DST classifier. For example the first classifier only passes with 35% of the 
data for further classification of unknown attacks. In order to avoid the problem of 
imbalanced data sets in KDD 99, Difference threshold is assigned to different classes (in 
our case, five different  for five classes).  
6.2.2.2 Second-Stage Classification for Unknown Attacks by Entropy Function 
Unlike regular intrusion detection algorithms in which the incoming data are classified as 
either the normal data or one of the known attacks based on the maximum likelihood of 
all known classes, in this work we will introduce another second-stage intrusion detection 
mechanism to identify the input data as either normal data, one of known attacks or 
unknown attack to compare with the Neutral Zone method as the second-stage classifier. 
The first stage detection is the same with last section to identify if the input data are the 
normal data or an attack based on the pignistic probability of each class hypothesis. If the 
class type of the maximum pignistic probability is the normal data ( norml ) or the following 
equation holds,  
)(maxarg)( qvqvnorm lBetPl =x         
(5.16) 
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the input data connection vx is considered to be a normal data connection. Since the 
classifier is fully and reliably trained with the labelled normal data, if (5.16) is true, the 
classification result becomes final and no further test is needed. However, if (5.16) is 
false, the input data are either one of the known attacks or a novel attack with unknown 
features and the following second-stage entropy-based test is needed to determine the 
attack type of the incoming data. 
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where µ is predetermined threshold between (0, 1).  If the hypothesis in (5.17) is true, i.e. 
the entropy of the generated pignistic probabilities is relatively small, the input data 
connection vx  is strongly correlated to one of known attacks. Therefore, vx  is considered 
to be one of the known attacks, and its class index q* in the class set is given by: 
)(maxarg)(* qvqv lBetPq =x         (5.18) 
However, if (5.17) is not true, the classification result is not credible and the input data 
are an unknown attack. The decision tree of the two-stage fuzzy classifier for known and 
unknown intrusion detection is shown in Figure 5.2. 
5.3 Experimental Results 
We still used DARPA KDD99 [29] Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset as a part of the 
benchmark for evaluating the performance of the proposed IDS in detecting known 
intrusions. In addition, we have generated an unknown attack dataset from Software 
Wireshark [30] to test the performance of the new algorithm for detecting unknown 
attacks.  
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FIGURE 5.2 DECISION TREE OF TWO-STAGE CLASSIFIER  
5.3.1 Dataset Selection  
In this experimental work, the 10% KDD dataset were used as the training dataset to train 
the FCM algorithm and finalize the optimal feature space centers of the known classes.  
Subsequently, the two-stage fuzzy classifier is built based on the training results.  Finally 
the corrected KDD 99 dataset and the unknown attack data generated from Wireshark are 
employed to evaluate the performance of our new classifier.   
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We add 5074 novel attack connections in this chapter to test our classifier. We use Mac 
OS X version 10.7.5 as the victim machine to hit malicious web sites running exploit kits 
such as Blackhole, which will probe our victim computer and attempt to infect it. Other 
methods we use are to visit malicious web sites either by offering of free or to click on 
spam e-mail messages. After being infected by these attacks, the Wireshark software 
installed on our victim machine is then used to manage and monitor malware activity.  
5.3.2 Data Sets Pre-processing 
Besides the normal data class, the KDD 99 datasets contain four types of known attacks, 
including the denial of service attacks (DoS), the user to root attacks (U2R), the remote to 
local attacks (R2L), and the probing attacks (Probe).  However, even for the concise 
10%KDD dataset, as its attack distribution statistics shown in Table 5.1, the data sizes are 
still overwhelmingly large for practical training and test applications.  In addition, the 
data records in KDD 99 for different attacks are not equally represented and those in the 
same class are unbalanced for training dataset (10%KDD) and the test dataset (Corrected 
KDD). For instance, the percentages of U2R and R2L attacks in the training dataset are 
0.105% and 2.279%, respectively, while those in the testing dataset are 0.733% and 
5.204%. The discrepancies in data sizes and class distributions could make the 
classification results unreliable.  
Furthermore, in the original KDD datasets, there are invalid and duplicated data records 
that need to be pre-processed and removed for algorithm training and testing.  Therefore, 
the cleaned and rebalanced KDD 99 datasets with a reduced and manageable size have 
been created for our experimental work by randomly sampling the 10% KDD and 
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Corrected KDD datasets, in which the redundant and invalid data records are removed. 
The statistics of the size-reduced KDD datasets we generated for this work are listed in 
Table 5.2.   In addition to the data records generated from the KDD datasets, we used 
additional 5074 data records containing unknown attacks in the testing phase to test the 
performance of our classifier. The types of the unknown attacks are summarized in Table 
5.3 and they include some of the recently created Internet viruses including adware, 
spyware and their variants. The features of the unknown attacks may or may not be 
represented by those of the known attacks in KDD datasets. The unknown attack data 
records are used to test the proposed classifier and evaluate its performance in detecting 
unknown intrusions without any training.  
The feature space of each connection in the KDD99 datasets and the unknown attack 
dataset we generated is composed of 41 feature components. For the KDD training data 
and unknown attack dataset, there is additional labelling information indicating which 
type of class the connection belongs to.  
5.3.3 Performance Evaluation  
To minimize the variations of our experimental results, we randomly divide both our 
training and test datasets into 10 subsets of equal sizes, and then we apply the new 
classifier to each pair of 10 training-testing subsets to evaluate its performance. We 
measure the performances of classifiers based on false positive rate (FPR), detection rate 
(DR) and overall error rate (OER).  FPR, DR and OER for detecting one of the known 
intrusions or an unknown attack (Class l) from a batch of validation connections are 
defined as follows. 
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where lFP  is the number of the connections that are incorrectly classified as Class l and 
lTN is the number of the connections that are correctly classified as a class other than 
Class l. 
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where lTP  is the number of the connections that are correctly classified as Class l and 
lFN  is the number of the connections that are incorrectly classified as a class other than 
Class l. 
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To compare the performance of the new classifying algorithm with those of the existing 
classifiers, we also apply several popular classifiers including the basic k-NN, evidence-
theoretic k-NN, naïve Bayes, and neural network classifiers [31, 32] to the same dataset 
used by the proposed classifier. The classification results are displayed with the receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) plots, i.e. DR vs. FPR for all classifiers. Specifically, 
ROC plots are shown in Figures 5.3-5.12, respectively, for detecting DoS, Probe, U2R, 
U2L and unknown attacks (UA) by using existing classifiers as well as the our proposed 
new classifier.  
Figure 5.3-5.7 show the new fuzzy DST classifier with neutral zone can almost compete 
other existing classifier in Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks, while it failed to achieve 
competitive detection rate with other classifiers in DoS attack. Figure 5.8-5.12 show that 
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the new fuzzy DST classifier with entropy function we are proposing almost outperforms 
all other existing classifiers by achieving higher DR and lower FDR for all known and 
unknown attacks.  Since DoS and Probe attacks usually reveal a sequential pattern that is 
different from normal connections, they can be relatively easily be differentiated from 
normal data records.  
However, U2R and R2L attacks do not possess a similar sequential pattern, and they are 
embedded in the data portions of the packets and normally only appear in a single 
connection. Therefore, the detection of U2R and R2L attacks from normal connections is 
more challenging than identifying DoS and Probe attacks; the detection rates of U2R and 
R2L intrusions with existing classifiers have been mostly unsatisfactory. However, using 
the new classifier, as shown our experiments, the detection rates of U2R and R2L attacks 
are significantly improved.  
Table 5.4 lists the overall error rates (OER) in detecting different known and unknown 
attacks by using our new classifier with entropy function and other existing classifiers. 
OER, as defined in (20), includes the effects of both DR and FPR for a classifier, 
therefore, is a better indicator of classification performance. The results in Table 5.4 
show that the OER of the new algorithm with entropy function is significantly lower than 
those of other existing classifiers in detecting the known and unknown intrusions.  
In implementing the two-stage fuzzy KNN-DST classifier we choose the predetermined 
threshold µ to be 0.85 in the second-stage entropy-based classification.  The second-stage 
detection is used to determine if an attack is unknown or one of known attacks, and it is 
only needed if the first-stage detection result is an attack.  The experimental results 
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demonstrate that the new classifier with entropy function is effective in identifying 
unknown attacks as well as detecting typical known attacks from normal data traffic.  
5.4 Conclusions 
An innovative two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier has been developed for effective 
detection of unknown intrusions and the variants of known intrusions. The new algorithm 
overcomes the rigid requirement of feature vector similarity between the training data and 
the test data in current IDS by introducing fuzziness, “soft” distance-based neighbouring 
concepts, and the DST-based evidence fusion method into the learning and classification 
schemes.   
Furthermore, the two-stage entropy-based classification approach is employed to identify 
unknown attack in the incoming connections without any pre-training data or labeled 
information for the attack.  The robustness and effectiveness of the new approach are 
demonstrated by the application results of the new classifier to the traditional KDD99 
intrusion data and the newly simulated data containing both known and unknown attacks.  
The experimental results also show that the new classifier outperforms the existing 
classification algorithms in identifying known and unknown attacks from network traffic.  
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TABLE 5.1 DATA RECORD CLASS DISTRIBUTION IN KDD 99 DATASETS 
Data Class  Training Set Testing Set Training % Testing % 
Normal 97,277 60,593 19.69% 19.48% 
DoS 391,458 229,853 79.24% 73.90% 
Probe 4,107 4,166 0.83% 1.34% 
R2L 1,126 16,189 0.23% 5.21% 
U2R 52 228 0.01% 0.07% 
Total 494,020 311,029 100%  100%  
 
TABLE 5.2 REDUCED TRAINING AND TESTING DATASETS (UA: UNKNOWN 
ATTACKS) 
Data Class  Total Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L UA 
Training Sets 145,585 87,831 54,572 2,131 52 999 0 
Testing Sets 51,041 47,913 23,568 2,682 215 2913 5074 
 
TABLE 5.3 UNKNOWN ATTACKS (UA) USED IN TESTING DATASETS FOR 
THIS WORK 
UA type Number of connections Percentage 
ZeroAccess botnet 1988 39.18% 
Adware 875 17.24% 
Spyware 869 17.13% 
Backdoor 412 8.12% 
Hijacker 275 5.42% 
Trackware 181 3.57% 
Downloader 187 3.69% 
Trojan 287 5.66% 
All UA types 5074 100% 
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TABLE 5.4 THE OVERALL DETECTION ERROR RATES OF OUR METHOD AND 
OTHER IDS  
 
(ET k-NN: evidence-theoretic k-NN; NN: Neural Networks; NB: Naïve Bayes) 
 
Class Ours Method ET k-NN k-NN NN NB 
DOS 5.22% 6.87% 11.18% 8.39% 6.57% 
Probe 3.90% 7.01% 12.07% 7.80% 6.21% 
U2R 8.12% 20.47% 35.06% 8.33% 13.13% 
R2L 9.98% 19.31% 24.60% 10.29% 10.45% 
UA 11.25% 40.68% 47.94% 44.88% 44.90% 
      
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3 ROC GRAPH OF DOS ATTACKS USING THE NEUTRAL ZONE  
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FIGURE 5.4 ROC GRAPH OF PROBE ATTACKS USING THE NEUTRAL ZONE  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.5 ROC GRAPH OF U2R ATTACKS USING THE NEUTRAL ZONE  
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FIGURE 5.6 ROC GRAPH OF R2L ATTACKS USING THE NEUTRAL ZONE  
 
 
FIGURE 5.7 ROC GRAPH OF UNKNOWN ATTACKS USING THE NEUTRAL 
ZONE  
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FIGURE 5.8 ROC PLOT OF DETECTING DOS ATTACKS USING ENTROPY  
 
 
FIGURE 5.9 ROC PLOT OF DETECTING PROBE ATTACKS USING ENTROPY  
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FIGURE 5.10 ROC PLOT OF DETECTING U2R ATTACKS USING THE ENTROPY  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.11 ROC PLOT OF DETECTING R2L ATTACKS USING THE ENTROPY 
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FIGURE 5.12 ROC PLOT OF DETECTING UNKNOWN ATTACKS USING THE 
ENTROPY  
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CHAPTER 6 
6.THREE-LAYER HIERARCHY ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER 
 
In this Chapter, we improve the overall network intrusion detection rate by proposing and 
using an innovative three-layer hierarchy multi-classifier detection scheme called 
ensemble classifier. In addition, combinational methods are used to fuse the outputs from 
the classifiers are studied. Experiments show that ensemble-classifier using a diverse soft 
computing technique and different feature subset as a combination of multiple classifiers 
can obtain a much more precise inference result than a single classifier. 
6.1 Introduction 
Ensemble is to combine the outputs of a set of base classifiers together in a proper way 
when classifying input data. The fused result is expected to perform a better outcome 
than that of any individual base classifier within the ensemble. However, it is important 
to understand that individual base classifiers should be independent of each other. If the 
base classifiers provide similar outputs, then no significant improvement of the ensemble 
result can be obtained through the combination process. It is critical to notice the 
diversity among base classifiers in order to get effective and correct classification result. 
Hence, two major categories have been proposed in the ensemble classifier design. One 
uses different feature subset in every base classifier and the other uses different soft 
computing technique. 
The former technique consists of a set of base feature selecting classifiers and each uses 
partial feature space. By choosing dissimilar feature subsets for various base feature 
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selecting classifiers, the diversity among these classifiers is expected to be maximized to 
achieve a better result. Example is the work of Giacinto and Roli [1]. In their research, 
they restricted the problem domain in the ftp service of the DARPA KDD99 data set and 
selected 30 out of the 41 available features from the data set features from the data set. 
They built three neural networks using 4 intrinsic features, 19 traffic features, and 7 
content features, respectively. Also, they built one neural networks using all of the 30 
selected features for the sake of comparison. All of the networks were three layers fully-
connected multilayer networks, which each had 5 output neurons (for normal and four 
attack classes), a number of input neurons that equal to the number of features, and a 
hidden layer made up of 5 neurons for the networks using distinct features and 15 
neurons for the network trained using 30 selected features. The results showed that the 
ensemble technique improved the overall detection performance compared with those of 
individual classifiers and the classifier using 30 features. However they only performed 
their experiments on ftp service instead of all of the services KDD99  data set provided. 
In the work of DeLooze [3], he created three 20X20 Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) using 
content, time, and connection features extracted from 41 features of KDD99  data set. 
The results of individual SOMs were then combined using both majority ensemble 
method and belief ensemble method. Here, the difficulty is how to configure a network 
with proper size. The configuration plays an important role in the detection performance 
and the granularity of the network nodes, which training a SOM with a large amount of 
neurons needs long computational time and a SOM with a small volume of neurons may 
loss some important information. 
83 
 
The work of Borji [4] is an example using different soft computing technique in every 
individual base classifier. He used KDD99 training data set in both training and test 
procedures as well as performed five-class (normal, DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L ) 
classification. He firstly used four base classifiers (neural networks, SVM, k -nearest 
neighbor (k -NN) and decision trees) to advance classification individually and then fused 
their inferences using three combination strategies: majority voting, average rule and 
belief function. He claimed his ensemble model overall got 99.68% detection rate (DR) 
and 0.87% false positive rate (FPR). However, he did not mention DR and FPR in each 
class. Also, we argue that if his experimental result still performed so well if KDD99 
testing set was included in his experiment. The reason is that the testing set has extensive 
new types of attacks that are not correlated with attacks shown in the training set. 
Another example can be found in the work of Mukkamala et al. [5]. They designed two 
ensemble models: one consisted of three multilayer feedforward neural networks and the 
other was made up of neural networks, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Multivariate 
Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS). By using the majority voting technique, the 
outcomes from individual base classifiers were then combined together. The 
experimental result showed that the ensemble approach produced a better result than that 
of each base classifier. In one of their experiments, they fused three base classifiers’ 
outputs with 48%, 0%, and 16% accuracies together and get 56% ensemble accuracy. 
However, Hansen and Salamon [6] had proved that multi-classifiers will only work when 
it is possible to build individual classifiers which are more than 50% accurate. 
Furthermore, they used the same data set in both training and test procedures, which the 
experimental result cannot explain the detection ability of novel attacks. 
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FIGURE 6.1 TOPOLOGIES OF PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
6.2 Three-Layer Hierarchy Ensemble Classifier Approach 
For a successful ensemble intrusion detection scheme, each classifier used in the system 
should be independent to others to achieve the best fusion result. Hence, we propose 
three-layer hierarchy multi-classifier intrusion detection architecture as illustrated in 
Figure 6.1.   
In the first layer, three groups are constructed and each of them consists of a set of three 
base feature-selecting classifiers. In order to improve the diversity of three classifiers, 
different soft computing techniques as well as feature spaces are carefully selected and 
applied to the base feature selecting classifiers. In the second layer, the inferences derived 
from three base feature-selecting classifiers in a group are integrated and optimized. 
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Finally, the outputs from three groups are fused together to draw a final conclusion of the 
ensemble in the third layer. 
There is often no clear boundary between normal and abnormal of a computer user’s 
activity. Patterns of attacks are sometimes similar to those of normal activities. Therefore 
in the kernel of base feature selecting classifiers we select a variety of supervised learning 
techniques that can provide capability of dealing with vagueness: two-stage Fuzzy KNN 
DST classifier (proposed in chapter 5), naive bayes classifier, and backpropagation neural 
network classifier. All of them are capable of providing a dynamic decision boundary of 
network traffic instead of only assigning network traffic to a member of normal category 
or a member of abnormal category. During the entire course of work, the same data set 
KDD99 is used for training and testing those different soft computing models. For 
maximizing the diversity of the ensemble, three partial feature subsets, 9 basic features 
(1-9), 13 content features (10-22), and 19 traffic features (23-41), of the original KDD99 
41 features are applied to three base feature selecting classifiers, respectively. 
The major threats to sensor networks are the external attack and internal attack [2]. The 
malicious user concept arises originally from the requirements for open use systems. 
These unauthorized intruders are not uniformly cleared both for reasons of operational 
need and economy. The external attack is countered by using combinations of physical, 
procedural and communications security techniques. These techniques, some highly 
advanced, are the bulk of the present state-of-the-art in security issues.  The internal 
attack is countered by using wormholes, sinkholes, select forwarding, and HELLO 
FLOOD attacks mostly through the routing process [3].  
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While we emphasize the threat from the malicious user, we are not unmindful of other 
security threats and risks.  The problem of accidental leaking classified information, 
physical penetration of system sites, interference with or interrupt of communication, 
mishandling of classified material and the like are serious. To a large extent, these 
problems are common to any information system processing classified information and 
can be solved by well-understood techniques. But the intrusion prevention techniques (1st 
line of defense) like encryption/decryption, key management, and authentication alone 
cannot sufficiently protect the sensor networks from these attacks. In effect, the defence 
against these attacks surrounds the system and its user community with a barrier that 
must be breached before the system can be compromised. By adopting an effective 
intrusion detection system (IDS) as 2nd line of defence, the threat attacks can also be is 
eliminated before they get into the system [4]. Total cost of recovery from network 
epidemics like Nimda, Bagle, Code Red, SQL Slammer, and Mpvars attacks [6] are 
ginormous to the whole society. Especially in some circumstances, the accuracy of the 
classifiers is so crucial that a wrong prediction of attacks may result in extraordinarily 
high costs. Misclassifications [7] may come from the high similarities of the feature set 
between two objects, which make it difficult to distinguish them precisely. 
6.3 Three Base Classifier For Three-Layer Ensemble Approach 
We choose three base classifier for three-layer ensemble approach. Having finished the 
process of base feature selecting classifiers’ derivations, all the decisions from multiple 
ones are combined into a fused result for each group. Finally, the predictions of three 
groups are then integrated to produce an ultimate conclusion of the ensemble.  
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6.3.1 Backpropagation Neural Network Classifier  
A backpropagation neural network uses a feedforward structure to solve classification 
problems by its supervised learning algorithm. It consists of a collection of processing 
units that are highly interconnected. The network weights are updated by using gradient-
based optimization algorithm during the training period. When the network converges to 
the local minima of error, the output layer of the network will show the result when data 
is fed into the input layer. Based on the data given for training, neural networks has the 
ability to learn how to process intrusion detection tasks. It acts as a computational model 
to process the network traffic information. It has the ability to generalize from learned 
data, and performs generalization of attacks and fault tolerance to imprecise and 
uncertain information. At the end of the training procedure, the future network traffic are 
then identified as whether malicious attacks or normal usage behavior. 
6.3.2 Two-Stage Fuzzy KNN DST Classifier 
The two-stage fuzzy KNN-DST classifier is proved to be capable to detect unknown 
intrusions and mutated versions of known intrusions. We choose to use the k-nearest 
neighbor (k-NN) algorithm for its robust performance and its tolerance for inaccuracy 
and random errors in the input data. 
In this developed new algorithm, a belief value of a test connection associated with a 
known class is softly measured based on the distance between the input data and the 
centroid of the class, and the Dempster-Shafter Theory (DST) is incorporated into the 
framework to fuse multiple evidences generated from a weighted k-NN algorithm to form 
a pignistic probability of a test connection belonging to a known class.  The centers of 
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known classes are softly defined and computed using a semi-supervised fuzzy c-means 
(FCM) algorithm from the training data.   
Stage one classification determines if a connection is normal data or an intrusion. If it is 
an abnormal intrusion, stage-two classification is needed to determine if it is one of 
known attacks or unknown attack. We choose this classifier as our one of base classifiers 
to detect the unknown attacks especially. 
6.3.3 Naive Bayes Classifier 
The naive bayes classifier is based on conditional probabilistic to perform decision of a 
classification problem. It uses Bayes' Theorem with independence assumptions, which 
assumes a set of features are conditionally independent of one another given a class. 
When a set of classes are observed in the training data, the naive bayes classifier then 
assign an observed data to one of classes with highest probability. By applying naive 
bayes classifier to an intrusion detection task, a set of training network traffic data is 
given to find the prior probabilities for normal or a known class of attacks. As unseen 
network traffic arrives, the classifier then uses Bayes Theorem to decide which class the 
traffic should belong to. 
6.4 Combination Methods For Three-Layer Ensemble Approach 
In order to evaluate the result of different combination methods, we carried out four 
fusion techniques: the majority voting rule, the average rule, Dempster-Shafer technique, 
and Bayesian combination method. We discover our proposed approach to compare with 
classical ensemble models, such as boosting and stacking. Freund & Schapire 
demonstrate the use of boosting ensemble classifier to produce series of classifiers based 
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on their performance. The examples predicted incorrectly by previous classifier are 
chosen more often for a new classifier to learn. While our method will pass on the 
connections which are classified with low confidence for further classification and label 
classified connections with high confidence with correct class. Stacking is a technique by 
using meta-learner, which chooses more reliable classifier to get higher accuracy.  
Grading is another technique by using grading classification as meta-classes. Both 
arbitrating and grading use disagreements from references to select a new training set 
without generating new attributes.  
Besides the notability of multiplicity among the base classifiers, the right choice of a 
combination method is also an important issue in creating a supreme performance. A 
variety of combination methods have been reported for combining the outputs of the base 
classifiers into an ensemble result. According to their characteristics, they can be 
classified as linear combination methods, non-linear methods, statistical-based methods, 
and computationally intelligent methods. Linear combination method is the simplest 
method to fuse base classifiers’ outputs together. Summation and average are the popular 
ways for the combination. Non-linear method such as majority voting is used when the 
output of classifier is a ranked list of classes in accordance with the degrees of belief on 
classes the input pattern belongs to. Statistical-based methods are Dempster-Shafer 
techniques and Bayesian combination methods. The computationally intelligent method 
is based on computational intelligence techniques such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, 
and Naïve Bayes algorithms.  
For comparing the performance of different combination operations in our intrusion 
detection task, we carry out four fusion techniques: the majority voting rule, the average 
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rule, Dempster-Shafer technique and Bayesian combination method to combine the 
outputs together. With equal posterior estimation distribution of classifiers’ output, the 
majority voting rule assigns the input network traffic to the majority class among the 
outputs of classifiers. The average rule assigns the input network traffic to the maximum 
value of the posterior probability summation divided by the number of classifiers we 
implemented. As for the Dempster-Shafer and Bayesian combination methods, both 
assign the input network traffic to the class with highest belief value. The difference 
between them is that the Bayesian combination method involves the computation of the 
prior probability of each class but Dempster-Shafer technique does not, while it computes 
the probability that evidences support the attack or normal classes we consider.  
6.5 Experimental Methodology  
6.5.1 The Data Set 
In our experiment, 10% KDD is taken as our training set and corrected KDD and 5074 
novel attacks are taken as our testing set, respectively. KDD 99 data sets are made up of a 
large volume of network traffic connections describing TCP connections and each 
includes 41 features plus a label of either normal or a type of attack. The training set 
includes 494,020 connections that are distributed as 97,277 normal connections, 391,458 
DoS attacks, 4,107 Probe attacks, 52 U2R attacks, and 1,126 R2L attacks. The testing set 
has two parts 311,029 KDD connections and 5027 novel attacks. The 311,029 KDD is 
made up of 60,593 normal connections, 229,853 DoS attacks, 4,166 Probe attacks, 228 
U2R attacks, and 16,189 R2L attacks.  The 5074 novel attack connections is added to test 
our classifier. We use Mac OS X version 10.7.5 as the victim machine to hit malicious 
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web sites running exploit kits such as Blackhole, which will probe our victim computer 
and attempt to infect it. Other methods we used are to visit malicious web sites either by 
offering of free or to click on spam e-mail messages. After being infected by these attacks, 
the Wireshark software installed on our victim machine is then used to manage and 
monitor malware activity. 
6.5.2 Preprocessing  
In the beginning of the experiment, we reduce the sizes of the original KDD 99 training 
and testing sets by removing the duplicated connections. The new training set has 
145,585 connections that are distributed as 87,831 normal connections, 54,572 DoS 
attacks, 2,131 Probe attacks, 52 U2R attacks, and 999 R2L attacks. The new testing set 
has 51,041 connections that are distributed as 47,913 normal connections, 23,568 DoS 
attacks, 2,682 Probe attacks, 215 U2R attacks, and 2,913 R2L attacks.  
For each connection, features represented by symbolic values are replaced by numeric 
values. For example, the values of icmp, tcp, and udp of feature protocol_type are 
replaced by values 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Values of each feature are normalized from 0 
to 1 in order to offer equal importance among features. Class labels, normal, DoS, Probe, 
R2L, U2R, and novel attack are replaced by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively. In addition, a 
class label with values 1 and 2 is added to indicate normal traffic and attacks (DoS, Probe, 
R2L, and U2R), respectively. 
6.5.3 Data Selection  
Although the KDD99 data set includes 39 different types of attacks, the problem of 
uncertainty exists caused by limited information of network traffic data. In real world 
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modern computer systems and networks, hackers constantly develop new attack codes to 
exploit security vulnerabilities of organizations every day. It is impossible to cover all 
intrusive behavior space especially unknown attacks in the collected data set.  
Accordingly, in order to simulate the problem of uncertainty, only a small amount of 
normal and attack connections are randomly selected from training and testing sets in 
each experiment. In the training set, all the 52 U2R attacks and 999 R2L attacks are 
included. For balancing the distribution of normal traffic and each attack group, 999 
connections are randomly selected for normal class and each attack group (DoS, Probe, 
and U2R). In the testing set, all the 215 U2R attacks are included. Also, 215 connections 
are randomly selected for normal class and each attack group (DoS, Probe, and R2L).  
6.6 Experimental Results  
For detecting the attacks, training and testing are performed in each trial. In the training 
phase, three classifiers, two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier, backpropagation neural 
network classifier, and naive bayes classifier, are constructed using the training data. The 
testing data are then fed into each trained classifier to identify normal behavior and 
intrusions in the testing phase. For two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier, three nearest 
neighbors are selected for each testing connection. For the backpropagation neural 
network classifier, numbers of hidden neurons within each neural network is decided by 
the number of input features, which is equal to the square root of number of input 
features multiply by two.  
We evaluate the performances of intrusion detection tasks by using standard 
measurements such as detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and classification 
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rate (CR). To minimize the inaccuracy and variation factor of experiment results, 10 trials 
are performed in every detection task and then the average of those trials is recorded. 
Table 6.1 shows the averaged DR and FPR performances of three classifiers in each 
group of the first layer, which classifiers 1, 2, and 3 represent two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST 
classifier, backpropagation neural network classifier, and naive bayes classifier, 
respectively. The groups 1 stands for 9 basic features, and the group 2 stands for the 13 
content features, and the group 3 stands for 19 traffic features are used, respectively.  
The results indicate that the two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier using content feature 
set has the best performance compared with those of other classifiers using partial feature 
set. It has very low FPR (1.33%) and DR (92.55%), which implies only few normal 
connections or malicious attacks are classified into normal behavior. By using group 1 of 
basic features set, two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier again has the best overall 
performance, which its CR reaches 89.03% and its FPR is only 6.23%. By using group 3 
of traffic features set, two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier compete with other two base 
classifier with its CR of  90.07% and FRP of 4.33%.  
For the backpropagation neural network classifier using basic feature set, it has both high 
FPR (93.21%) and DR (94.16%), which represents most of the connections are classified 
into attack group. For the Naïve Bayes classifier using content feature set, it has both 
high FPR (88.50%) and DR (13.44%), which represents most of the connections are 
classified into attack group. In general, the performances of two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST 
classifier using three diverse partial feature sets are equally well compared with those of 
the other two classifiers. 
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TABLE 6.1 THE PERFORMANCE OF THREE FEATURE SELECTING 
CLASSIFIERS 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
  DR FPR CR  DR FPR CR  DR FPR CR 
 Classifier 1 96.59 6.23 89.03  92.55 1.33 94.57  94.21 4.33 90.70 
Layer 1 Classifier 2 94.16 93.21 76.69  85.98 13.72 86.04  83.49 10.28 84.73 
 Classifier 3 63.53 3.35 70.16  88.50 13.44 88.11  65.47 1.07 72.16 
 
 TABLE 6.2 THE PERFORMANCE USING MAJORITY VOTING AND AVERAGE 
RULE 
  Majority Voting Average Rule 
  DR FPR CR DR FPR CR 
Layer 2 
Combiner 1 85.70 16.56 85.25 89.02 16.74 87.87 
Combiner 2 88.74 13.58 88.28 52.79 7.16 60.80 
Combiner 3 80.35 5.44 83.19 80.00 4.74 83.05 
Layer 3 Final Result 87.21 5.26 88.72 85.03 2.19 87.59 
 
TABLE 6.3 THE PERFORMANCE USING DEMPSTER-SHAFER AND BAYESIANS 
  Dempster-Shafer Bayesian 
  DR FPR CR DR FPR CR 
Layer 2 
Combiner 1 88.60 16.74 87.53 90.55 17.95 88.85 
Combiner 2 15.14 0.37 32.04 90.12 13.81 89.33 
Combiner 3 77.17 4.93 80.75 86.74 11.53 87.09 
Layer 3 Final Result 83.49 1.91 86.41 93.35 9.63 92.75 
 
Table 6.2&6.3 shows the performances of combiners on layers 2 and 3 using different 
combination methods. The results show that all of the four fusion techniques improve the 
overall performances in FPRs, DRs, and CRs compared with those of individual 
classifiers using partial feature sets shown in Table 6.1. For evaluating the performance 
95 
 
of the proposed ensemble model, the experiments of three classifiers using the entire 41 
features are also done and the results are demonstrated in Table 6.4  
The result indicates that all of the three classifiers using full feature set have equivalent 
CRs. All of their FPRs are below 11% and all the DRs do not reach to 85%. It also shows 
all of the four combination methods outperform the three classifiers using full feature set. 
Especially, the Bayesian combination method achieves the best outcome, which FPR, DR, 
and CR are 9.63%, 93.35% and 92.75%, respectively.  Table 6.3 shows a comparison of 
three classifiers using full feature set and approaches using four different combination 
methods.  
Consequently, we further analyze its detection accuracies of five attack groups with other 
classifiers and Table 6.5 shows the result. From the values we observe, the ensemble 
approach using the Bayesian combination method performs well in detecting DoS, Probe, 
U2R, and unknown attacks that each one has over 93.5% DR, R2L attacks with over 
83.24% DR. 
6.7 Summary 
Ensemble-classifier technique has been applied to the intrusion detection task. We 
developed a three-layer hierarchy structure that includes three groups and each of them 
consists of three base feature selecting classifiers. In each base feature selecting classifier, 
we apply different machine learning algorithms and feature subsets to solve detection 
uncertainty problem and maximize the data diversity to achieve the best fusion result. 
During the experiments, we use a very small amount of network traffic data to simulate 
the limited information for the network embedded systems. Also, we compared the 
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performances of different combination methods in fusing the outputs derived from first 
and second layers in the proposed model. The experimental results have demonstrated 
that this hierarchy-structure method can achieve a better detection performance than that 
of a single classifier using either partial feature subsets or the full feature set. The result 
also shows that the Bayesian combination method achieves the best detection accuracy 
among the four diverse combination techniques. In addition the unknown attacks have 
been detected with good performance by using our proposed three-layer ensemble 
classifier. 
TABLE 6.4 THE PERFORMANCE OF THREE FEATURE SELECTING 
CLASSIFIERS 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
  DR FPR CR  DR FPR CR  DR FPR CR 
 Classifier 1 95.47 6.26 90.48  92.23 3.08 88.82  92.31 5.27 89.45 
Layer 1 Classifier 2 92.75 89.37 74.52  80.40 14.02 81.28  80.71 11.05 80.25 
 Classifier 3 59.32 4.48 64.32  80.41 12.89 78.61  67.52 3.07 69.21 
 
TABLE 6.5 COMPARISION RESULT 
Method Normal Probe DoS U2R R2L Unknown 
3 layer Ensemble (DR%) 99.85 99.36 99.79 93.50 83.24 95.24 
3 layer Ensemble (FP%) 0.05 0.36 0.04 12.73 11.58 11.13 
DT (DR%) 98.77 78.68 94.72 51.43 2.84 35.70 
DT (FP%) 14.96 0.57 2.85 0.10 0.03 14.23 
ID3 (DR%) 99.93 97.85 99.51 49.21 62.75 18.46 
ID3 (FP%) 0.10 0.55 0.04 0.14 10.03 3.15 
C4.5 (DR%) 98.3 99.7 76.3 21.1 30.2 42.90 
C4.5 (FP%) 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 6.25 
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NB (DR%) 98.08 83.32 94.53 51.43 9.54 27.38 
NB (FP%) 14.22 0.62 0.84 0.24 0.60 4.40 
MLP (DR%) 99.6 75.5 99.71 14.3 32.7 33.15 
MLP (FP%) 0.04 0.32 0.02 0.82 5.31 1.49 
ESC (DR%) 98.2 84.1 99.5 14.1 31.5 27.32 
ESC (FP%) 0.12 0.67 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 
Boosting (DR%) 99.22 82.48 95.36 35.71 5.51 22.57 
Boosting (FP%) 15.01 0.46 0.44 0.01 0.03 7.26 
Bagging (DR%) 98.74 80.03 94.72 42.86 3.46 31.84 
Bagging (FP%) 14.18 0.41 4.64 0.02 0.30 2.39 
CFC (DR%) 99.03 97.46 88.24 60.00 21.47 16.22 
CFC (FP%) 10.46 1.45 0.75 0.04 0.03 8.54 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
In this chapter, we summarize the research and then review the thesis contributions. At 
last, we discuss important future work. 
7.1 Summary  
This thesis describes an intrusion detection system for detecting computer intrusions from 
network traffic data. It consists of classification programs and rules, ensemble classifiers 
model, and two-stage classifiers.   
We start with our research on studying the work in the field of intrusion detection 
systems. We describe the techniques used in designing intrusion detection systems as 
well as examine several representative approaches that have been implemented in 
intrusion detection systems. We then indicate that the data sources used by intrusion 
detection systems do have some problems, which are problem of irrelevant and redundant 
features, problem of uncertainty, and problem of ambiguity. These problems not only 
hinder the speed of detection but also decline the detection performance of intrusion 
detection systems.  
We study the problem of uncertainty and ambiguity in audit network traffic data. The key 
idea is to imitate ambiguous of users’ activities by fuzzy clustering technique, and to 
simulate uncertainty caused by limited information by incorporating only a small amount 
of network traffic data for analysis. Then, we identify future network traffic by fusing 
evidences found in clustering development by the use of Dempster-Shafer theory. Also, 
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we employ k-NN technique to speed up the detection process. We compare our result 
with those derived from three k-NN based unsupervised classification algorithms. The 
experimental results demonstrate that our approach has a superior performance to the 
other three algorithms. The results also demonstrate that our approach is capable of 
solving network traffic data which contain degrees of uncertain information.  
We propose an ensemble intrusion detection model. We believe that the system is a 
preferable solution to achieve a higher detection performance with a combination of a set 
of base classifiers, which are built on the top of different feature subsets. In the ensemble 
intrusion detection model, In this paper, the ensemble-classifier technique is applied to 
the intrusion detection task. We develop a three-layer hierarchy structure that includes 
three groups of classifiers and each consists of three base feature selecting classifiers. In 
each base feature selecting classifier, we apply different machine learning algorithm and 
feature subset to solve uncertainty problem and maximize the diversity. During the 
experiments, we only include a very small amount of network traffic to simulate 
uncertainty caused by limited information. Also, we compare the performances of 
different combination methods in fusing the outputs derived from the first and second 
layers of proposed model. The experimental results demonstrate that this hierarchy 
structure obtain a better detection performance than that of a single classifier using either 
partial feature subset or full feature set. The result also shows that the Bayesian 
combination method achieves the best detection accuracy among those four diverse 
combination techniques. In the future, we will continue the research of further improving 
detection performance of both normal and malicious activities, especially in promoting 
the detection accuracy in R2L attacks 
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At last, An innovative two-stage fuzzy k-NN DST classifier has been developed for 
effective detection of unknown intrusions and the variants of known intrusions. The new 
algorithm overcomes the rigid requirement of feature vector similarity between the 
training data and the test data in current IDS by introducing fuzziness, “soft” distance-
based neighbouring concepts, and the DST-based evidence fusion method into the 
learning and classification schemes.  Furthermore, the two-stage entropy-based 
classification approach is employed to identify unknown attack in the incoming 
connections without any pre-training data or labelled information for the attack.  The 
robustness and effectiveness of the new approach are demonstrated by the application 
results of the new classifier to the traditional KDD99 intrusion data and the newly 
simulated data containing both known and unknown attacks.  The experimental results 
also show that the new classifier outperforms the existing classification algorithms in 
identifying known and unknown attacks from network traffic.  
7.2 Thesis Contributions  
We recap the thesis contributions as follows. 
• We design a supervised machine learning algorithm that combines k-nearest 
neighbors technique, fuzzy clustering technique, and Dempster-Shafer theory. We 
apply this algorithm to intrusion detection task and successfully solve the uncertainty 
problems caused by deficient incomplete and ambiguous network traffic information.  
• We propose an ensemble intrusion detection model that combines ensemble feature 
selection classifier and data mining classifier. It is a three-layer hierarchy structure, 
which each base classifier acts as an independent intrusion detector. By combining 
101 
 
these decisions from multiple base classifiers, this framework improves the detection 
performance.  
• Unknown malicious attacks can be correctly classify by entropy function to improve 
the overall detection rate involving unknown abnormal behaviors in discovering 
intrusive behaviors. 
• Semi-supervised learning is used to help predictive model testing to reduce the cost 
and improve the performance by using both labeled data (usually small amount) and 
unlabeled data (usually large amount) for training.  
7.3 Future Work  
Up to now, this dissertation has developed a network intrusion detection system based on 
ensemble of multiple base detectors. However, there are several interesting and important 
topics that need to be future explored. 
• False alarms: In the design of anomaly intrusion detection systems, not only a high 
detection rate is necessary but also a low false alarms rate is required. However, it is 
not easy to control the false alarm rate because many unusual events sometimes are 
classified to hostile activities and most of these unusual events are actually normal 
behavior. In our research, we use data mining technique to extract decision rules from 
training set to reduce the number of false alarms. We believe that the false alarm rate 
can be further reduced in the future if a more dedicated rule set can be built. The 
solution could be achieved by applying a better data mining algorithm. 
• Respond to the intrusions: In our work we focus on developing a detection method 
which can efficiently and effectively differentiate intrusive activities from large 
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volume of network events. We believe that the respond to the intrusions is also 
equally important. Once an intrusion is happened, it is necessary to properly present 
the alarm in order that system administrator can make correct and prompt decision. In 
a word, to find a method to integrate the intrusion detection system with the intrusion 
response system deserves further research. 
• Feature selection: Feature selection plays an important role on both speed and 
accuracy of intrusion detection. It selects the most informative features that cover 
normal and intrusive activities by analyzing large quantity of network traffic data. In 
this dissertation we have developed a feature selection algorithm based on 
symmetrical uncertainty measure to remove the worthless information from the 
original high dimensional database. However, we think there are still some issues that 
can be explored in order that a better performance of our designed intrusion detection 
system can be obtained, e.g., relevant and redundant features analysis and 
discretization methods and correlation based methods implementation and 
comparison.  
• Multiple identification ability: The KDD99 data set includes four groups of attacks 
and each uses diverse skill to explore system’s vulnerabilities. In our work we use 
binary classification technique to identify a network event as either normality or 
abnormality. The future direction could upgrade our system with multiple 
identification ability, i.e., the system can classify a network traffic data to normal 
activity or one of four attacks. 
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